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I. INTRODUCTION
The internationalization of the securities markets' is progressing
rapidly.2 Corporations are approaching foreign market places for the
1. See Pozen, Disclosure and Trading in an International Securities Market, 15
INT'L LAW. 84 (1981) [hereinafter Pozen (Disclosure)] (the internationalization of the
securities markets occurs when a corporation sells its securities in countries other than
its principal place of business, or when the same class of securities is listed on more
than one exchange, creating a secondary market).
2. See Exchange Act Release No. 21958, 50 Fed. Reg. 16,302 (1985) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (proposed Apr. 25, 1985) (discussing the increase in equity
through international securities trading). The factors prompting international stock li-
quidity include the technological progress in communications and transportation
throughout the world, prosperity in developed nations, the relaxation of foreign ex-
change controls, the abandonment of United States investment controls, efforts by in-
vestors and corporations to alter funding and investment sources, differentials in inter-
est rates, and the advent of floating exchange rates. Id. at 50 Fed. Reg. 16,302; see
also Exchange Act Release No. 6568, 50 Fed. Reg. 9281 (1985) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 230) (proposed Mar. 7, 1985) (presenting some reasons for the expanding
international stock markets); Williams & Spencer, Regulation of International Securi-
ties Markets: Towards a Greater Cooperation, 5 J. COMP. CORP. L. & Sac. REG. 279
(1982) (explaining that advancements in communication and technology are encourag-
ing multinational corporations to invest in international exchanges); Letter from the
London Stock Exchange to John Wheeler, Secretary, SEC (Aug. 8, 1985) (asserting
that improvements in communications prompted the internationalization of the securi-
ties market).
Technological change has led to the increase in the internationalization of the se-
curities markets. See Debs, The Development of International Equity Markets, 4 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 7 (1986) (explaining how the advancements in technology affected the global
expansion in securities markets). The modernizing effects of technology allow investors
to obtain information and to have access to markets more quickly and with greater
ease. See Letter from Toronto Stock Exchange to John Wheeler, Secretary, SEC, (Jul.
5, 1985) [hereinafter Toronto Letter] (recognizing the informational benefits individu-
als will receive through international markets).
In addition, investors observe foreign market growth through exchange mecha-
nisms to obtain the best investment. See Du Bois, The Year Eight Foreign Markets
Outpaced Wall Street, Barrons, Jan. 7, 1985, at 63, col. 1 (discussing the greater per-
formance by the following eight foreign markets when compared to the United States
markets: United Kingdom, Mexico, Spain, Italy, Holland, Japan, France, and
Belgium). Many issuers list outside the domestic market because they outgrow the do-
mestic market's capacity for providing liquidity, their potential for shareholders in-
creases, the foreign markets relax requirements and there are cultural similarities
among the various foreign markets. See More U.S. Concerns Seek to be Listed Over-
seas, Wall St. J., Jun. 10, 1985, at 6, col. 2 (noting the increased interest of foreigners
in trading on global markets to expand their portfolios). Multinational transactions are
encouraged by deregulation of financial markets, the restructuring of financial commu-
nities through increased merger and acquisition endeavors, the continued reduction of
foreign barriers to entry, and major U.S. investors' growing awareness of international
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sale of securities.3 Investors are looking toward foreign markets as an
alternative to domestic exchanges." This recent amplification of inter-
national securities transactions prompted proposals designed to form an
international framework within which securities transactions can tran-
spire spontaneously among nations with differing securities laws. The
initial plan establishes market links among various nations' securities
exchanges.6 Eventually, these market links will likely include other for-
investment opportunities. See Shopkorn, Global Trading. The Current and Future Im-
pact on United States Markets and United States Portfolio Managers, 4 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 25, 26 (1986). Others believe that the trend towards internationalization results
from global recovery in the wake of the 1982 recession. Key factors include reduction
of oil prices, interest rates, inflation and regulatory standards. Address by John Shad,
Chairman, SEC, XI Annual Conference of the International Association of Securities
Commissions (Jul. 16, 1986) [hereinafter Shad's Speech].
3. See Release No. 21958, supra note 2, at 16,302 (exemplifying the increase in
corporations investing abroad).
4. See id. (discussing the increase in equity through international securities trad-
ing); see also U.S. Investors Slash Foreign Portfolios as Domestic Vigor Lures Back
Dollars, Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 1985, at 58, col. 3. About $10 to $13 billion is held by
United States investors in foreign equities compared to $1 to $2 billion in the late
1970's. See Kristoff, World Financial Curbs Eased by Technology and Ideology, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 26, 1985, at 1, col. 3 (describing the historical factors leading to the inter-
nationalization of the securities markets); U.S. Department of Commerce, The Interna-
tional Investment Position of the United States, 1970-1983, 64 SURVEY OF CURRENT
BUSINEss 40 (August 1984) (providing statistics on foreign investors). Nineteen foreign
private issuers raised $2.3 billion through debt offerings in the United States in 1983.
See Release No. 21958, supra note 2, at 16,303. In addition, foreign government issu-
ers offered $3.1 billion in debt in the United States in 1984. Id. (citing 44 SEC
MONTHLY STAT. REV. 14 (Feb. 1985)). Net foreign purchases of United States equities
increased from $3.9 billion in 1982 to $5.2 billion in 1983. The gross of transactions
made by foreign investors in United States equities totaled $134.3 billion in 1983. Id.
In 1984, the foreign securities volume was greater than 817 million shares on the
NYSE (3.5% of the total market volume), 197 million shares on the AMEX (12.8% of
the total market volume), and 906 million shares on NASDAQ (5.9% of the total mar-
ket volume). See Release No. 21958, supra note 2, at 16,303 (stating the various for-
eign securities volumes for domestic exchanges). By 1988, researchers anticipate that
domestic activity in foreign securities will increase from $30 billion to $60 billion and
foreign activity in domestic stocks will elevate from $134 billion to $167 billion. Letter
from National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) to John Wheeler, Secre-
tary, SEC (Nov. 4, 1985) [hereinafter NASD Letter] (citing statistics researched by
Arthur Anderson & Company and the Securities Industry Association). Furthermore,
the market is expected to have a fivefold increase in the number of companies that
trade around-the-clock and throughout the globe. Shad's Speech, supra note 2, at 3.
5. See infra notes 8-47 and accompanying text (discussing proposals to interna-
tionalize the securities markets).
6. See infra notes 14-47 and accompanying text (discussing the various market
linkage proposals).
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eign exchanges and facilitate the development of a 24-hour around-the-
globe market system.
The progress of the market linkage system, however, is inherently
hindered by blocking laws. Generally, blocking laws bar investigation
of transactional evidence. These laws may impede surveillance of the
markets and prevent enforcement of securities laws in international
transactions. Once foreign investors and issuers begin to manipulate
SEC enforcement and surveillance tactics, havoc will ensue.7 Foreign
market participants will not be prevented from engaging in fraudulent
market transactions and soon will totally manipulate the market. In
this way, what appears to be an advance in global exchange trading
may eventually result in market collapse.
This Comment examines the internationalization of the securities
markets as it has grown through electronic market links and has been
impeded by blocking laws. Part II examines the current market links
and future linkage plans that will facilitate the development of a sys-
tem of internationalized markets. Part III provides a general overview
of secrecy and blocking laws and their effects on international securities
transactions. Part IV evaluates the market linkage plans in light of for-
eign nations' use of blocking laws, a practice which will occur more
frequently as multinational market trading increases. Finally, Part V
recommends proposals to alleviate the problems that arise when block-
ing laws are imposed after transactions occur within the market links.
Orderly implementation of proposals for internationalizing the markets
requires cooperation and uniformity in the laws of participating na-
tions, cemented by bilateral and multilateral agreements.
II. INTERNATIONALIZATION: MARKET LINKAGE PLANS
Securities professionals are proposing and experimenting with
methods to promote an orderly internationalization of the secur-
ities markets. The major proposals include market linkages8 and a
24-hour market.9 Market links presently exist under certain linkage
7. See infra notes 109-193 and accompanying text (describing the methods of ob-
taining information and the SEC's surveillance tactics).
8. See infra notes 14-47 and accompanying text (describing the development of
United States-Canadian and United States-United Kingdom market links).
9. The 24-hour market is a concept envisioning the trading of securities around-
the-world on an around-the-clock basis. See Shopkorn, supra note 2, at 26 (describing
the 24-hour market in greater detail); see also Moessle, The Basic Structure of U.S.
Securities Law Enforcement in International Cases, 16 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1 (1986)
(recognizing the future proposal of a 24-hour around-the-globe market). International-
ization of Capital Markets: Hearings Before Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
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plans. 10 As these linkage plans become more sophisticated, the transna-
and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 94 [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of
Charles N. Villiers, director, National Westminster Bank, PLC). Other approaches
have been taken to implement this proposal. Under one concept, public offers are
passed from a closed market place to an open market place. Author's interview with
Andrew Feldman, Esq., Division of Market Regulation, SEC, in Washington, D.C.
(Jul. 30, 1986) [hereinafter Interview]. See Letter from Securities Industry Association
to John Wheeler, Secretary, SEC [hereinafter SIA Letter] (Oct. 17, 1985). One exam-
ple of a premature implementation is when Shearson Lehman/American Express
transacts in London before the United States markets open, then shifts the securities in
United States issues to New York when that market opens, and finally moves the trans-
actions in foreign issues to New York after the London market closes. NASD Letter,
supra note 4, at 4. International brokers or dealers pass the internal order books from
time zone to time zone so that foreign equities may be traded around-the-clock. See
Release No. 21958, supra note 2, at 16,302 (noting the markets' ability to pass the
books, extending the exchange's working hours); see also Letter from Samuel E.
Hunter, Senior Vice President, Merrill Lynch Capital Markets to John Wheeler, Sec-
retary, SEC (Sept. 30, 1985) [hereinafter Merrill Lynch Letter] (discussing how trans-
actions take place over a 24-hour period through the passing of books). Merrill Lynch
trades NASDAQ on a 24-hour basis by moving its book from New York to Tokyo to
London and back to New York. The foreign equities traded by Merrill Lynch around-
the-clock are the following: Japanese, Amsterdam, Singapore and Hong Kong. See
NASD Letter, supra note 4 (illustrating how companies utilize the 24-hour market
mechanism).
A problem arises, however, regarding the shifting of the books from one time zone
to another. There exists a two hour lapse in time because Tokyo is twelve to fourteen
hours ahead of New York. When the New York market closes at 5:00 p.m., the Tokyo
market is closed as well since it is only 7:00 a.m. in Japan. Unaccounted hours, there-
fore, occur when transactions take place between Japan and the United States. See
Hunter, The Status and Evolution of Twenty-four Hour Trading: A Trader's View of
International Transactions, Clearance and Settlement, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J. 15 (1986) (il-
lustrating the problem of a time gap when implementing a Japanese market in the 24-
hour market scheme). The second concept envisions markets located in different time
zones that would stay open for 24 hours. See id. (discussing an alternative to passing
the books by having each market stay open for 24 hours). The New York Stock Ex-
change may alter its hours and propose that its market stay open around-the-clock. Id.
at 9. If the markets stay open for extended hours or even for 24 hours, then the prob-
lem of gaps in the 24-hour system may be resolved. Id. at 16.
Surveillance of this around-the-clock proposal will likely be developed through
agreements. See Letter from the American Stock Exchange to John Wheeler, Secre-
tary, SEC (Dec. 13, 1985) [hereinafter AMEX Letter] (explaining how the AMEX-
TSE linkage has established an agreement to develop surveillance mechanisms). This
will enable AMEX to make transactions in off-hours if a 24-hour proposal is imple-
mented. Id.; see infra notes 129-163, 248-264 and accompanying text (discussing the
use of bilateral or multilateral agreements in order to ensure surveillance over interna-
tional securities transactions).
10. See infra notes 14-47 and accompanying text (describing the implementation
of market linkage proposals).
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tional exchange system will become more elaborate. This system will
ease the transition from separate markets to a 24-hour world-wide mar-
ket system.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)," in conjunction
with United States securities professionals outside the Commission, is
currently studying ways to establish greater liquidity in international
stock transactions without jeopardizing the regulatory structure. 2 The
United States and the more developed foreign nations have the greatest
opportunity for success in establishing securities market links between
their respective exchanges because they share similar cultures and legal
systems."3
Currently, market linkage proposals are under expansive develop-
ment. These linkage plans are catalysts for investment trade at an in-
ternational level. Through these proposals, investors and issuers are in-
volved in international trading not only through links among the
foreign exchanges but also through a 24-hour market. The Canada-
United States link was the first linkage structure established; later this
system was expanded to include the United Kingdom-United States
link.
A. Market Links Between Canada and the United States
1. Market Linkage Plans
The SEC approved a linkage between the Boston Stock Exchange
(BSE) and the Montreal Exchange (ME) in November 1984. This plan
was the first formal international linkage.14 This linkage established an
11. See 10 H. BLOOMENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURI-
TIES REGULATION § 3.01 (1986) (describing the obligations and nature of the SEC);
see also infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (noting the background and responsi-
bilities of the SEC).
12. See NASD Letter, supra note 4, at 8 (discussing the creation of "market
center-to-market center" linkages providing for trade and price information while es-
tablishing surveillance and market regulations implemented throughout the linkage
systems).
13. Cf. Exchange Release No. 21958, supra note 2, at 16,302-16,309 (comment-
ing on the possibility of expanding the market links to other countries which exhibit
fewer cultural similarities to the United States, such as Japan); Letter from Amster-
dam Stock Exchange to John Wheeler, Secretary, SEC (Jun. 27, 1985) (noting the
benefits of a link between the United States and an Amsterdam market); Letter from
Tokyo Stock Exchange to Richard G. Ketchum, Director, Division of Market Regula-
tion, SEC [hereinafter Tokyo Letter] (Jun. 29, 1985) (expressing the Tokyo Stock Ex-
change's desire to become involved in a market linkage proposal, but also realizing the
problems of implementing such a plan).
14. Exchange Act Release No. 21449, 49 Fed. Reg. 44,575 (1984) (proposed
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electronic connection between the ME and BSE allowing ME traders
to execute transactions on the floor of BSE.' 5 The successful link be-
tween the BSE and the ME expedited efforts to increase the interna-
tionalization of the securities markets and led the SEC to approve a
linkage between the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the To-
ronto Stock Exchange (TSE). 6 The tie between AMEX and TSE was
the first link between a primary market in the United States and a
primary market in a foreign nation.17 This plan benefited both coun-
tries by giving American and Canadian investors access to the best
price on either exchange.18 Subsequently, the Midwest Stock Ex-
change, Inc. (MSE) proposed a link with the TSE similar to the
AMEX-TSE link." The MSE-TSE link created a new way for orders
to flow between the United States and Canada. This plan provided
greater liquidity for both issuers and investors from these countries.2 0
These three market links are seminal ties that may lead to other mar-
ket links, around-the-clock trading, and universal securities trading.
Nov. 1, 1984). The BSE-ME linkage became the first of its kind between Canada and
the United States. Id.; see infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (noting the imple-
mentation of this linkage proposal through "Phases").
15. Release No. 21449, supra note 14, at 44,575. The SEC will only allow the
linkage involving Montreal orders in 40 United States-listed Canadian stocks. See Ex-
change Act Release No. 21925, 50 Fed. Reg. 14,480 (1985) (proposed Apr. 12, 1985)
(noting the electronic mechanism used in linkage proposals); Release No. 21958, supra
note 2, at 16,304.
16. See Exchange Act Release No. 22442, 50 Fed. Reg. 39,201 (1985) (proposed
Sept. 27, 1985) (showing how the BSE-ME link led to the AMEX-TSE link). The
Commission found trading procedures, including surveillance and cooperation between
the regulatory agencies of the SEC and the Quebec Securities Commission, to be satis-
factory. On April 4, 1985, the AMEX proposed to the SEC a link between their ex-
change and the Toronto Stock Exchange. Id. The SEC approved this proposal on Sep-
tember 20, 1985. See also Exchange Act Release No. 23075, 51 Fed. Reg. 11,854
(1986) (proposed Apr. 7, 1986) (comparing the BSE-ME and the AMEX-TSE linkage
proposals).
17. See Release No. 22442, supra note 16, at 39,201 (noting the linkage between
two primary markets). The Toronto Stock Exchange is Canada's largest public securi-
ties market, with approximately 74 percent of the dollar value of all shares in Canada.
The American Stock Exchange is the primary United States market with regard to
total equity securities traded on the floor. Id.; see also AMEX Letter, supra note 9
(discussing the characteristics of AMEX and TSE); Letter from Toronto Stock Ex-
change to John Wheeler, Secretary, SEC (Jul. 23, 1985) (explaining how the AMEX-
TSE proposal links two major markets).
18. See Release No. 22442, supra note 16, at 39,202 (noting how the linkage
between two major markets will be advantageous to both domestic and foreign
investors).
19. Release No. 23075, supra note 16, at 11,855.
20. Id. (noting the flow of orders between MSE and TSE).
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2. Traffic Routes for Securities Orders
In the BSE-ME link, trades are generated only from ME to BSE 2"
and thus the transactions are only "southbound." Future plans, how-
ever, contemplate "northbound" traffic. 2 This proposed traffic scheme
would enable orders to originate from the floor of BSE, while the trans-
action takes place on ME." Other market link proposals include simi-
lar traffic plans.
The AMEX-TSE linkage plan differs slightly from the BSE-ME
link. Because both the AMEX and the TSE are primary markets, or-
ders are dually listed.24 The traffic route for transactions, therefore, is
not only "southbound '2 5 but also "northbound, ' 26 enabling stock trad-
ing to occur from Toronto to New York as well as from New York to
Toronto. This dual order traffic scheme increases the domestic transac-
tions from a major United States market to a primary foreign
market.21
Initially, the order traffic in the MSE-TSE link is on a one-way
basis "southbound." Orders, therefore, will only originate on the MSE
floor and will travel through the link to TSE. Once the TSE becomes
capable of simultaneous currency transactions, the traffic will move
"northbound" as well.28
21. Release No. 22442, supra note 16, at 39,202.
22. Id. (describing the traffic route established for the BSE-ME link).
23. Id. (explaining where the market traffic will take the securities orders).
24. See Release No. 22442, supra note 16, at 39,202 (illustrating that traffic will
be going both northbound and southbound since both linked markets are major ex-
changes). A market limit order will take approximately 30 seconds to enter the system.
Later, the link will include all limit orders, not just marketable limit orders. Toronto
Letter, supra note 2, at 10.
25. See Release No. 22442, supra note 16, at 39,202 (describing the northbound
traffic traveling from TSE to AMEX).
26. See id. (noting the traffic pattern going from AMEX to TSE). Initially, orders
may be executed only at the originating market. Eventually, the linkage will include all
limit orders. Toronto Letter, supra note 2. Linkage will allow the direct flow of orders
between the AMEX and TSE. See AMEX Letter, supra note 9 (describing the process
transactions encounter when participating in linked markets).
27. See Release No. 22442, supra note 16, at 39,203-39,204 (noting the effects of
international market transactions).
28. See Release No. 23075, supra note 16, at 11,855 (explaining the future pro-
posals regarding traffic patterns and market quotations for the MSE-TSE link). Once
the transactions become northbound and southbound, the MSE's quotes will be the best
national bid and offer made by the Consolidated Quotation System whereas the TSE's
obligation does not necessitate the quotation of the Canadian best bid and offer. Id.
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3. Plans Establishing the Linkage Proposals and the Procedures to
be Followed
The BSE-ME linkage plan operates in phases.2 9 Phase I estab-
lished the initial link between the two exchanges. Recently, BSE
planned Phase II, implementing an Intermarket Trading System
(ITS) 30 via the Montreal Exchange's Registered Representative Order
Routing and Execution System (MORRE). 3' The BSE and the ME, in
addition, created a Joint Floor Committee to supervise the development
of the linkage between these two exchanges.32
The AMEX and the TSE established a Trading Linkage Plan.
This plan confirmed the agreements of the two exchanges regarding the
linkage.33 In addition, the AMEX created a new set of rules"" to imple-
ment the Trading Linkage Plan as well as ensure application of the
other rules of the Exchange. 8 Furthermore, the rules of the market
receiving the order apply to all linkage transactions. 6
The TSE and the MSE agreed to a Memorandum of Understand-
ing Respecting a Trading Linkage.3 7 This Memorandum covers all as-
29. Release No. 21449, supra note 14, at 44,575. The BSE planned the second
phase (Phase II) which built upon the initial proposal through expanding the list of
securities though the Intermarket Trading System (ITS). Exchange Act Release No.
21925, 50 Fed. Reg. 14,480, 14,481 (1985) (proposed April 12, 1985). ITS links the
over-the-counter (OTC) market for multiple traded and listed securities and participat-
ing exchange floors. The ITS utilizes the ordering system via the Montreal Exchange's
Registered Representative Order Routing and Execution. System (MORRE) and allows
trades of approximately 200 BSE stocks. Release No. 21958, supra note 2, at 16,304.
30. See Exchange Act Release No. 21925, supra note 29, at 14,480 (discussing
how the ITS benefits the surveillance mechanisms of the market links). The ITS is a
computer linked electronic intermarket routing order system permitting multiple traded
stocks to be sent directly from one exchange to another. Exchange Release No. 18713,
[1982 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,214 (May 6, 1982).
31. Release No. 21925, supra note 29, at 14,481. MORRE is an automated small
order routing and execution system containing a library of eligible stocks. The
MORRE price or higher will be given to every order executed from BSE. Id.
32. See id. (discussing the use of a committee to enforce the laws of the market
links).
33. See Release No. 22442, supra note 16, at 39,203 (explaining how the plan
will be used to benefit the proposal); see also Exchange Act Release No. 22001, 50
Fed. Reg. 19,507, (May 8, 1985) (discussing the description of the Trading Linkage
Plan).
34. See Release No. 22442, supra note 16, at 39,201 (noting AMEX Rules 240 to
244).
35. See id. at 39,202 (recognizing the application of the new set of rules to the
AMEX-TSE link).
36. See id. (illustrating situations in which the plan will be implemented).
37. Release No. 23075, supra note 16, at 11,857; see infra notes 132-138 and
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pects of the MSE-TSE linkage, including administration, enforcement
and surveillance.8 8 The Memorandum also establishes a six-member
joint operating committee that oversees the linkage.39
The linkage of the markets between the United States and Canada
set a precedent for other market links providing investors and issuers
an increased opportunity to obtain greater liquidity and better prices.'
Issuers looked to United Kingdom stocks as an alternative to the stocks
listed on the Canadian exchanges.
B. Market Links Between the United Kingdom and the United
States
London is an appealing market for foreign investment."1 The
London Stock Exchange (LSE) and the United States National Associ-
ation of Securities Dealers (NASD), desiring to participate in interna-
tional securities transactions, developed the first transatlantic exchange
of stock quotations."2 The LSE and the NASD agreed to a two-year
accompanying text (describing the Memorandum of Understanding between the
United States and Canada).
38. See Release No. 23075, supra note 16, at 11,857 (describing how the Memo-
randum will benefit the market links); see also Exchange Act Release No. 22156, 50
Fed. Reg. 24,902 (1985) (proposed Jun. 12, 1985) (suggesting the establishment of the
Memorandum in order to develop surveillance agreements).
39. Release No. 23075, supra note 16, at 11,856. The committee's duties involve
developing and implementing the proposed linkage, monitoring its operation, explora-
tion of any potential expansion or enhancement of the linkage, and addressing any
potential problems or deficiencies with the linked markets. Id.
40. Id. at 11,855; see Letter from the law firm of Whitman & Ransom to John
Wheeler, Secretary, SEC (Jul, 12, 1985) [hereinafter Whitman & Ransom Letter], at
10 (expressing the viewpoint that the British investors realized the changes in the Ca-
nadian investors' status since the Canadian law is similar to the United States securi-
ties procedures).
41. See Letter from New York Stock Exchange, Advisory Committee on Interna-
tional Capital Markets to John Wheeler, Secretary, SEC (Jul. 15, 1985) [hereinafter
NYSE Letter] (discussing the equitable benefits a United States-United Kingdom link
will bring to foreign investors). For instance, Japanese companies traded about 60 eq-
uity-related offerings on the London market compared to only one on the New York
market. See id. at 8 (illustrating the increasing popularity of the London market to
foreign investors).
42. See Shad's Speech, supra note 2, at 6; see also Exchange Act Release No.
23158, 51 Fed. Reg. 15,989 (1986) (proposed Apr. 29, 1986) (describing the proposed
market link between the United States and the United Kingdom). Prior to the planned
link between LSE and NASD, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc. (PHLX) pro-
posed a linkage between their exchange and the London Stock Exchange to trade for-
eign currency options on both floors. See Exchange Act Release No. 22351, 50 Fed.
Reg. 25,340 (1985) (proposed Aug. 30, 1985) (noting the proposal of a PHLX-LSE
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pilot program through which the two exchanges sought to develop a
linkage plan. 3 The pilot program provides for an automated quotation
and order mechanism through the LSE's Stock Exchange Automated
Quotation (SEAQ) system'4 and the NASD's automated quotation sys-
tem (NASDAQ). 41 The proposed relationship between NASD-LSE
differs from the plans linking Canadian and United States markets in
that the United States-Canadian exchange linkage contemplates trad-
ing links. Purchases of securities between the United States and the
United Kingdom will occur in the process each market separately
uses."' This procedure is similar to the order execution process and
traffic routes the Canadian-United States market links implement.47
When fraudulent activities occur within the established market links,
participating countries may impose their blocking laws to hinder an in-
vestigation of these illegal events.
III. BLOCKING LAWS: THE ROADBLOCKS TO UNITED STATES
INVESTIGATIONS
A. Background on Secrecy and Blocking Laws
1. General Secrecy and Blocking Laws
Canada and the United Kingdom are among the numerous coun-
tries that have secrecy or blocking laws.4 8 Secrecy laws primarily pro-
market link).
43. See Release No. 23158, supra note 42, at 15,990 (explaining how NASD and
LSE created the link between their two exchanges). The proposed linkage attempts to
establish the exchange of information between these two nations and increase traders'
interest in over-the-counter (OTC) securities in London and LSE stocks traded in the
United States. Id.
44. See SIA Letter, supra note 9, at 5.
45. See Release No. 23158, supra note 42, at 15,989-15,991 (explaining the appli-
cation of NASDAQ system for executing transactions as well as describing the entire
proposed NASD-LSE link).
46. Id.
47. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text (describing the transaction pro-
cedures developed for Canadian-United States linkage proposals).
48. See Fedders, Policing Internationalized U.S. Capital Markets: Methods to
Obtain Evidence Abroad, 18 INT'L LAw. 89, 91 (1984) [hereinafter Policing Interna-
tionalized U.S. Capital Markets] (discussing the imposition of secrecy or blocking laws
when a foreign participant invests in the United States securities markets). The coun-
tries' secrecy statutes vary among the approximately twenty nations which enacted
these laws. The Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, El Salvador, Switzerland,
Greece, the Bahamas, Costa Rica, Liechtenstein, Cayman Islands, and Panama have
established bank secrecy statutes. The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Israel, Ber-
muda, Montserrat, Anguilla, Caicos, Turkey, Antigua, Barbados, and St. Vincent do
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tect the confidentiality of information of banking and financial institu-
tions.49 Secrecy laws often are not merely regulatory measures but
reflect national public policy.50 These laws view confidentiality as a
fundamental right.51
The rationale behind secrecy statutes is analogous to the attorney-
client privilege in the United States. Both theories prohibit the disclo-
sure of confidential information in order to protect the parties in-
volved.5 Specifically, secrecy laws prevent any disclosure of a cus-
tomer's financial information, including the individual's identity,
business records and accounts, unless the client consents to revealing
these facts. 53 Without these laws, disclosure may expose a person ac-
cused of violating securities laws to criminal or civil liability. 4
not have secrecy statutes but have customs similar to secrecy laws. Letter from James
D. Cockwell, Chairman, Institute of Foreign Bankers, Inc. at 4 n.3 (Dec. 1, 1984)
[hereinafter Cockwell Letter] (Comment on SEC Release No. 21186, File No. 7-27-84
"Waiver by Conduct"); Fedders, Wade, Mann & Beizer, Waiver by Conduct- A Pos-
sible Response to the Internationalization of the Securities Markets, 6 J. COMP. Bus.
& CAP. MKT. L. 1, 3 (1984) [hereinafter Waiver by Conduct]. The information, how-
ever, differs from source to source. See Note, Foreign Bank Secrecy and the Evasion of
United States Securities Laws, 9 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 417, 422 n.24 (1977)
[hereinafter N.Y.U. Note] (noting that a recent report found 27 jurisdictions enacted
some variation to bank secrecy laws); Release No. 21186, [Jul.-Dec.] 16 Sec Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 1305, 1307 (Aug. 3, 1984) (recognizing only 15 countries with secrecy
laws).
49. Moessle, supra note 9, at 21.
50. Id. (noting that German banking secrecy reflects public policy). The Swiss
established the bank secrecy laws to protect its bank customers from foreign govern-
ments' oppression. In the 17th century, the Swiss protected the French Huguenots who
used Switzerland as a haven from religious persecution. During World War II, Swit-
zerland codified this custom into its secrecy statute in order to protect the identity of
German Jews, fleeing Nazi Germany, who opened Swiss bank accounts. The Swiss
government wanted to prevent any bank employee from assisting Nazi investigation.
Waiver by Conduct, supra note 48, at 31.
51. Moessle, supra note 9, at 21.
52. Letter from the law firm of Baker & McKenzie to Shirley E. Hollis, Acting
Secretary, SEC (Nov. 29, 1984).
53. See Moessle, supra note 9, at 21 (discussing the concept of an individual's
opportunity to waive his right of privacy). Some nations mandate an express waiver,
while others allow simply an implied waiver; Waiver by Conduct, supra note 48, at 31;
see also supra notes 194-224 and accompanying text (analyzing the concept of waiver
by conduct).
54. N.Y.U. Note, supra note 48, at 417. Usually criminal proceedings will ensue
when bank secrecy laws are violated. See Waiver by Conduct, supra note 48, at 33
(listing penalties for violations of bank secrecy laws). Specifically, Switzerland's Article
47 of the Federal Banking Law provides that knowing intent or inducing a violation
will lead to imprisonment for up to six months or a fine of up to Sfr. 50,000. H. ScH-
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Blocking laws, like secrecy statutes, prohibit the disclosure, investi-
gation, duplication, and removal of documents from a country. 55 Block-
ing laws, however, differ from secrecy laws in that blocking statutes
protect state interests. 6 In addition, the waiver concept, utilized in se-
crecy statutes proceedings, may not be implemented with respect to
blocking laws because the primary rationale behind blocking provisions
is the protection of national rather than individual interests.5 7
Foreign nations enact blocking statutes for two reasons: first, to
prevent the disclosure of information by their citizens as parties to
United States litigation, and second, to prevent the United States gov-
ernment from conducting investigations and imposing its regulations
within their borders.58 These countries criticize as an invasion of sover-
eignty5 9 actions of the United States and attempts of foreign countries
to impose extraterritorial substantive laws, especially in antitrust
proceedings.6"
ULTZ, BANKING SECRECY AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS 8 (1983);
see also Moessle, supra note 9, at 21 (describing the peculiarity of Swiss bank secrecy
laws).
55. Note, Secrecy and Blocking Laws: A Growing Problem As the International-
ization of the Securities Markets Continues, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 809, 821-822
(1985) [hereinafter Vanderbilt Note] (defining the concept of blocking statutes). Na-
tions with blocking laws are Great Britain, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Australia, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Sweden, and Switzerland. Release No. 21186, supra
note 48, at 11, [Jul.-Dec.] 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. at 1307; Waiver by Conduct, supra
note 48, at 36.
56. Moessle, supra note 9, at 22.
57. Id. Blocking laws do not provide a private right of action while secrecy laws
do. Id.; see infra notes 211-224 and accompanying text (criticizing the application of
the waiver by conduct approach because an individual cannot give consent for the dis-
closure of evidence relevant to national interests).
58. See Comment, Arbitration, Forum Selection & Choice of Law Agreements in
International Securities Transactions, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1069, 1091 (1985)
[hereinafter Washington & Lee Comment] (discussing the rationale behind the enact-
ment of blocking statutes); see also Pettit & Styles, The International Response to the
Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 697, 698-
699 (1982) (illustrating foreign countries hostility towards the United States imposing
its laws on transactions involving their nations); Comment, Shortening the Long Arm
of American Antitrust Jurisdiction. Extraterritoriality and the Foreign Blocking Stat-
utes, 28 Loy. L. REV. 213, 234-268 (1982) [hereinafter Loyola Comment] (describing
the foreign blocking laws of various nations and how these nations oppose the United
States' application of extraterritorial laws).
59. Waiver by Conduct, supra note 48, at 36; Letter from Andress F. Lowenfeld
(Nov. 26, 1984) (Comment on SEC Release No. 21186, File No. S7-27-84 "Waiver by
Conduct") [hereinafter Lowenfeld Letter].
60. Waiver by Conduct, supra note 48, at 37. When the United States applies its
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There are two types of blocking laws: discovery blocking laws and
judgment blocking laws. Discovery blocking laws bar any request for
documents by foreign courts, agencies or individuals.61 Judgment
blocking laws prohibit the domestic enforcement of foreign courts' or
administrative agencies' decisions.62 As is true with secrecy laws, viola-
tion of either discovery or judgment blocking laws may lead to impris-
onment and/or fines.6"
2. Canadian and United Kingdom Secrecy and Blocking Laws
As a result of Canada's experience with the United States' anti-
trust enforcement laws,64 the 1980 session of the Canadian Parliament
enacted the Foreign Proceedings and Judgment Bill of 1980.65 The Ca-
nadian government consistently asserted that United States laws and
extraterritorial authority infringed upon Canadian national sover-
eignty. 6 While this Act covers all provinces in Canada, provincial
blocking laws also exist.
In Canada, the provinces generally pass laws on a territorial rather
than on a federal level. In response to anti-trust suits, the provinces of
Quebec and Ontario also developed Acts that bar disclosure of business
documents.67 These Acts are general discovery blocking statutes that
prevent the disclosure of documents related to litigation from the prov-
inces.6 8 The Quebec Business Concerns Records Act69 and the Ontario
broader antitrust laws to foreign countries, the foreign countries are usually unable to
bring a private suit. Nations, therefore, retaliate by enacting blocking laws. Id.
61. Waiver by Conduct, supra note 48, at 35.
62. Id. at 36-37.
63. Id. at 39.
64. See Loyola Comment, supra note 58, at 253 (describing the history behind the
Canadian blocking laws).
65. Foreign Proceedings and Judgments Bill 1980, Bill C-41, 1st Sess. 32d Parlia-
ment, 29 Eliz. I1 (1980), cited in [July-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
973, at A-19 (July 17, 1980); see infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text (discussing
the British Protection of Trading Interests Act).
66. Loyola Comment, supra note 58, at 256 (citing the Task Force on the Struc-
ture of Canadian Industry, Canadian Privy Council Office, Foreign Ownership and the
Structure of Canadian Industry (1968)).
67. Id. (discussing the enactment of blocking laws and their effect on antitrust
cases); see In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Addressed to Canadian Int'l Paper Co., 72 F.
Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
68. Davidson, The Canadian Response to the Overseas Reach of United States
Antitrust Law: Stage I and Stage II Amendments to the Combines Investigation Act, 2
CAN-U.S. L.J. 166, 167 (1979).
69. QUE. REv. STAT. ch. 278 (1964) (redesignated QUE. REV. STAT. ch. D-12
(1977)).
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Business Protection Act 70 cover not only anti-trust suits but also gen-
eral requests to the Canadian court to bar disclosure. 71 These provincial
laws, however, only apply within the respective jurisdictions.7" More-
over, documents cannot be taken out of the jurisdiction of the
province. 73
The United Kingdom, like Canada, encountered problems when
the United States imposed its extraterritorial jurisdiction and thus en-
acted several statutes to counter the United States' authority.7" The
Parliament legislated the Protection of Trading Interests Act of 19807
to counter United States discovery procedures. 76 The Protection of
Trading Interests Act (the PIA) affects foreigners' ability to obtain evi-
dence in England, specifically in anti-trust suits or awards of significant
damages.77
Under the PIA, the British Secretary of State can circumvent cer-
tain "measures" that are destructive of the United Kingdom's trading
interests.78 The PIA applies not only to business transactions and anti-
trust laws but also to securities laws. The British Secretary of State has
extraterritorial control over anyone subject to a civil or criminal United
States suit while doing business in the United Kingdom.
The PIA allows the British Secretary of State to protect persons in
the United Kingdom from being subject to disclosure requirements.
The individual will not have to produce a court requested document,
disclose the existence of any document, or publish any data that is not
70. ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 54 (1970). The Ontario Business Records Protection Act
prohibits the disclosure of any information involving Ontario business in any foreign
proceeding. If, however, another law of Canada or a province provides for disclosure,
then the information may be revealed. Washington & Lee Comment, supra note 58, at
1091.
71. Loyola Comment, supra note 58, at 253.
72. See Myrick and Love, Obtaining Evidence Abroad for Use in United States
Litigation, 35 Sw. L.J. 585, 613 (1981) (discussing various cases that illustrate conflict
between being subject to sanctions for not disclosing information, and not complying
with Canadian blocking laws).
73. Id.
74. See Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of
Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 262-82 (1981) (describing how
the British attempt to circumvent the United States extraterritorial authority).
75. The Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11.
76. See Lowe, supra note 74, at 273 (describing the principles of the Protection of
Trading Interests Act).
77. Loyola Comment, supra note 58, at 240.
78. The Protection of Trading Interest Act, 1980, c. 11, § 1(1). The "measures"
that may be taken by the Secretary are administrative, judicial and other governmental
actions. Id. at § 1(2) and § 1(3).
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within the court's jurisdiction. The Secretary of State was given the
power to prohibit compliance out of concern that disclosure would in-
fringe upon the sovereignty, national interests or international relations
of the United Kingdom.79 Similarly, the United Kingdom's Act allows
the British Secretary of State to bar implementation of foreign discov-
ery requests. When requests infringe upon British jurisdiction, security,
governmental relations or sovereignty, the United Kingdom may im-
pose its blocking laws.80
IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE BLOCKING LAWS: OBTAINING
INFORMATION WITHIN THE MARKET LINKS
The internationalization of the securities markets, specifically the
implementation of market links, may be hindered when a country im-
poses its blocking laws. Enforcement conflicts will arise among the reg-
ulatory agencies because of the differences in their structure and meth-
odology. 81 Discrepancies in disclosure and insider trading laws will
cause surveillance problems. Regulatory agencies will be unable to con-
trol the market, and inadequate enforcement will lead to fraud and ma-
nipulation. 2 Chaos will ensue and may extend to investors who will
"market shop" for the most lenient exchange, 8' and this scenario may
lead to the collapse of established market links.
A. Regulation of Enforcement and Surveillance
Each country has its own unique methods for enforcing securities
laws and regulating securities transactions within its borders.84 Difficul-
ties may arise when two countries with different regulatory procedures
interact. This dissonance in the system inevitably leads to market
linkage problems. In order to neutralize the disparities, the various reg-
ulatory agencies must come to a mutual understanding as to their func-
tion and role.
While securities regulatory agencies function with similar underly-
79. Id. at § 2.
80. Id.
81. See infra notes 84-112 and accompanying text (discussing the type of regula-
tory function of the United States, Canada and United Kingdom agencies).
82. See infra notes 84-108 and accompanying text (evaluating the regulatory
agencies problems in combatting fraud and manipulation in the market place).
83. See infra notes 108-109 and accompanying text (recognizing the ability of
traders to choose which market they will be able to manipulate).
84. See generally 10 H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 11, at §§ 3.01, 4.01, 6.01 (ex-
amining the securities regulatory agencies of the United States, United Kingdom and
Canada).
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ing goals, their modes of regulation differ. Canada regulates all securi-
ties transactions through provincial agencies. The provinces generally
attempt to cooperate with each other on regulatory matters in order to
establish a uniform enforcement system.85 But Canadian federal legis-
lation does not exist; each provincial jurisdiction has its own laws.8" A
federal statute, however, covers securities transactions through the ap-
plication of the Criminal Code and the Canada Business Corporations
Act.87 These Canadian regulatory policies are similar to those of the
United States.88
The primary regulator in the United States, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC), is an independent governmental agency.
The SEC enforces United States securities laws by investigating civil
and criminal actions. Through its rule-making authority, the SEC su-
pervises and manages the stock exchanges and the NASD.
In the United Kingdom, the Department of Trade and Industry
performs a similar function but differs greatly from the SEC. The De-
partment of Trade supervises unlisted companies (covered by the Third
Schedule of the Companies Act 1985).89 This agency has the authority
to license securities dealers. The police are involved in criminal securi-
ties actions except when the statute imposes upon the Department of
Trade the obligation of prosecuting or investigating the incident. 90 The
United States and Canada rely more upon governmental agencies
whereas in the United Kingdom the self-regulatory agencies act as
enforcers.
Canada's two self-regulatory agencies are the stock exchanges and
the Industry Association. 91 The Canadian stock exchanges are gener-
ally smaller than United States markets. The Industry Association, a
national organization establishing financial requirements and monitor-
ing the market standards, has fewer supervisory responsibilities than
85. See 10 H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 11, at § 4.01[2].
86. See id. (indicating that four Canadian provinces model their own statutes af-
ter the Ontario Uniform Act).
87. See Release No. 21449, supra note 14, at 44,576 (stating the two federal laws
that Canadian regulatory agencies apply).
88. See 10 H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 11, at §4.01 (comparing the similar
goals of Canadian regulatory agencies to the objectives of American agencies).
89. Release No. 6568, supra note 2, at 9385; see 10 H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note
11, at § 6.01 [1] (describing the role the Department of Trade takes in regulating
securities transactions).
90. See 10 H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 11, at § 6.01[2] (describing the role the
police take in regulating the stock market and noting how the police handled the crimi-
nal offenses dealing with illegal securities acts).
91. See id. at § 4.01[4].
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the stock exchanges.9
In the United States, a system of self-regulatory organizations reg-
ulates the stock exchanges and securities industry. 3 These self-regulat-
ing agencies are made up of ten active, registered national securities
exchanges and NASD.94 The role of the United States securities mar-
ket regulators as well as the SEC is to prevent injustice in the United
States securities market.
In ,the United Kingdom, self-regulatory agencies are more domi-
nant because governmental controls are generally relaxed. The British
market relies upon the professional bodies in the field. The London
Stock Exchange regulates trading without government supervision."
The United Kingdom has begun to rely upon a self-regulatory system
that will be similar to that of the United States."
Brokers or dealers conduct their transactions based upon the rules
and regulations of the London Stock Exchange.97 The disciplinary
function of the London Stock Exchange is performed through an Ap-
peals Committee and penalties range from censure to expulsion.98 In
addition, the London Stock Exchange analyzes and scrutinizes the in-
formation supplied by offerors of securities who wish to be listed on the
Exchange.99
The stock exchanges in London work in conjunction with London's
Panel on Take-overs and Mergers. 100 The Panel' 01 interprets and ad-
ministers the London City Code on Take-overs and Mergers." 2 This
organization performs an advisory role regarding take-overs and merg-
92. See id.
93. Karmel, Regulatory Aspects of Securities Trading, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J. 105, 108
(1986).
94. See 10 H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 11, at § 3.01[2].
95, Karmel, supra note 93, at 108.
96. Id. The United Kingdom, however, is cautious not to have a governmental
body such as the SEC "compel effective self-regulation." Id.
97. Pimlott, The Reform of Investor Protection in the U.K.-An Examination of
the Proposals of the Gower Report and the U.K. Government's White Paper of Janu-
ary 1985, 7 J. COMp. & CAP. MKT. L. 141, 144 (1985).
98. Id. In addition, the Stock Exchange requires each firm to have a "minimum
solvency ratio," to disclose annual statements, and to submit a quarterly, unaudited
balance sheet. Id.
99. id.
100. See 10 H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 11, at § 6.01 [3](b) (describing the role
of the Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers).
101. See id. (defining the Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers).
102. Pimlott, supra note 97, at 145. The Panel controls only take-over offers and
other similar issues specifically concerned with the method in which the bid is offered.
Id.
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ers but has no legal status.
London securities professionals established the Council for the Se-
curities Industry (CSI).103 The CSI supervises transactions, upholds
ethical standards, develops new codes of conduct and resolves differ-
ences within the London securities market. 104 This organization's obli-
gations are to control the areas of the City Code that are not managed
by the Panel.
The differences in mechanisms of the various countries' regulatory
agencies may lead to conflicts in enforcement of their respective securi-
ties laws, particularly with disclosure and insider trading. Surveillance
is the primary means of enforcing the securities laws.10 5 Surveillance,
however, will become more difficult as a result of the internationaliza-
tion of the securities markets. 06 Because the SEC has jurisdiction only
over citizens of the United States and individuals within the United
States, enforcement of foreigners' transactions will be very complex.
The SEC maintains its function as a regulatory body while being flexi-
ble in controlling foreign investors.10 7 When foreign nations impose
their blocking laws, the SEC will be hindered in investigating and pros-
ecuting fraudulent actions.
Foreign participants may choose to trade in the United States be-
cause of their ability to use their country's blocking laws to circumvent
discovery proceedings. Foreigners engaged in transactions involving the
United States, through the market links, may participate in fraudulent
transactions if they believe the SEC will be unable to enforce United
States securities laws. Insider trading will then escalate and induce
market manipulation. This cycle may continue until market links are
corrupted by the lack of any surveillance. The entire exchange system
may eventually collapse if market nations do not cooperate to develop
an international enforcement system.
Alternatively, foreign issuers may look to non-United States mar-
kets to completely circumvent SEC surveillance. The implementation
of existing linkage proposals encourages issuers to "market shop" to
find the most profitable exchange.
103. Id. at 145.
104. Id. Many securities professionals, however, envision the CSI as more of a
discussion group rather than a regulatory body. See L.C.B. GOWER, REVIEW OF INVES-
TOR PROTECTION: A DISCUSSION DOCUMENT, 38-39 (1982).
105. See Release No. 21958, supra note 2, at 16,309.
106. Id.
107. See Whitman & Ransom Letter, supra note 40 (examining the degree of
control the SEC has over foreign investors). The SEC struck a balance that accomo-
dated foreign investors and treated domestic issues fairly. Id.
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Generally, issuers offer their securities in the jurisdiction where
the cost of debt capital is lowest. Issuers prefer to participate in simul-
taneous offerings in several jurisdictions. For example, an issuer with
securities listed on stock exchanges in various jurisdictions may offer its
equity securities in each of the jurisdictions in order to provide an in-
vestment opportunity to all of its shareholders. Offering securities in
foreign jurisdictions may also help to raise the corporate profile of an
issuer in those jurisdictions. Furthermore, when offerings are made
available in several jurisdictions, professional investors have a greater
opportunity to search for more profitable investments" 8 by trading in
the jurisdiction with the best currency exchange rate and the best quo-
tations. Overall, foreign issuers will ultimately benefit from "market
shopping" by selecting an exchange that is subject to lenient securities
laws and has regulators who will not interfere with the sovereignty of
the issuer's nation.
B. Methods for Obtaining Information in a Market Linkage
System
If a nation whose issuers trade through a market link imposes its
blocking laws, the SEC may employ various tactics to obtain informa-
tion about possible fraudulent activity. The success of a procedure
often depends upon the relationship of the countries involved. These
tactics may be costly and time-consuming no matter what country the
SEC investigates.
1. Voluntary Cooperation
Occasionally, foreign suspects may divulge information volunta-
rily. The concern about adverse publicity and retribution from United
States courts often leads suspects to produce their records.1"9 Foreign
issuers and individuals, however, rarely volunteer to produce requested
documents.
When a country imposes its secrecy or blocking laws, the SEC first
responds through diplomatic channels. The goal is mutual cooperation
between the SEC and the foreign nation. Diplomatic means, however,
usually result in failure. 1 '
In a few circumstances, individuals or institutions have complied
108. Merrill Lynch Letter, supra note 9.
109. Policing Internationalized U.S. Capital Markets, supra note 48, at 99.
110. Vanderbilt Note, supra note 55, at 827.
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with SEC investigations voluntarily."' Voluntary cooperation and SEC
diplomatic measures are generally unsuccessful." 2 If attempts at mu-
tual cooperation fail, the SEC must utilize other means of obtaining
information.
2. International Efforts to Gather Evidence
a. Hague Evidence Convention
The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil
or Commercial Matters (the Convention),' provides procedures for
obtaining evidence permitted by the State authorities, as long as the
information is "utilizable" in the State where the trial is held."' The
Convention establishes two devices for gathering evidence: 1) letters of
request, and 2) the use of diplomatic officials, consular agents, and
commissioners." 5
The Convention's letters of request may only be executed through
orders from a United States District Court."" Orders may not be de-
nied, even when a State's internal law gives exclusive jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action or the State's internal law does not give
a right of action." 7
The Convention instructs diplomatic officers and consular agents
in foreign countries to secure evidence only without compulsion" 8 or if
S11. Policing Internationalized U.S. Capital Markets, supra note 48, at 99.
112. Id. Great Britain usually refuses to cooperate in investigatory requests during
the pre-indictment stage. See Olsen, Discovery in Federal Criminal Investigations, 16
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 999, 1006 (1984).
113. 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1781 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983)) [hereinafter Hague Convention].
114. See Von Mehren, Discovery Abroad: The Perspective of the U.S. Private
Practitioner, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 985 (1984).
115. See infra notes 118-120 and accompanying text (examining the utilization of
consular agents, commissioners and diplomatic officers).
116. See Myrick and Love supra note 72, at 592 (describing Article I of the
Hague Convention that defines "other judicial act" as not encompassing any judicial
discovery procedures).
117. Id. at 593. English courts, however, have broad discretion with respect to
Letters of Request. Courts may deny execution if requirements are not strictly fol-
lowed. If the order interferes with a state's sovereignty, the court may not execute the
action. Id.
118. See id. at 595 (describing the implications of Article 21 with respect to ob-
taining evidence). Article 21 provides in pertinent part:
Where a diplomatic officer, consular agent or commissioner is authorized under
Articles 15, 16 or 17 to take evidence-
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the foreign nation grants permission for disclosure. 11 9 Information may
be obtained when a foreign nation gives permission for parties to pro-
ceed with discovery.120 Thus, the Convention limits the process individ-
uals may use to gather evidence but does not remove the barrier estab-
lished by secrecy and blocking laws, because the Convention does not
force disclosure.
The Convention will only be effective if American discovery re-
quests are made in accordance with the Convention rules and if Ameri-
can courts comply with these rules. Although the United States has
ratified the Convention, few courts look to it when making judicial de-
(b) a request to a person to appear or to give evidence shall, unless the recipi-
ent is a national of the State where the action is pending, be drawn up in the
language of the place where the evidence is taken or be accompanied by a transla-
tion into such language;
(c) the request shall inform the person that he may be legally represented
and, in any State that has not filed a declaration under Article 18, shall also in-
form him that he is not compelled to appear or to give evidence;
(e) a person requested to give evidence may invoke the privileges and duties
to refuse to give the evidence contained in Article 11.
Id.
119. Id. at 596. Article 16 of the Convention states:
A diplomatic officer or consular agent of a Contracting State may, in the territory
of another Contracting State and within the area where he exercises his functions,
also take the evidence, without compulsion, of nationals of the State in which he
exercises his functions or of a third State, in aid of proceedings commenced in the
courts of a State which he represents, if-
(a) a competent authority designated by the State in which he exercises his
functions has given its permission either generally or in the particular case, and
(b) he complies with the conditions which the competent authority has speci-
fied in the permission.
A Contracting State may declare that evidence may be taken under this Article
without its prior permission.
Id.
120. Id. Article 17 of the Convention states:
In a civil or commercial matter, a person duly appointed as a commissioner for the
purpose may, without compulsion, take evidence in the territory of a Contracting
State in aid of proceedings commenced in the courts of another Contracting State
if -
(a) a competent authority designated by the State where the evidence is to be
taken has given its permission either generally or in the particular case; and
(b) he complies with the conditions which the competent authority has speci-
fied in the permission.
A Contracting State may declare that evidence may be taken under this Article
without its prior permission.
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cisions. Amendments to the Convention may increase its usefulness in
securing foreign information.121
Canada has not ratified the Convention because of concerns that
difficulties may arise. 122 The absence of a federal state clause in the
Convention creates a barrier which restricts Canada from implement-
ing the Convention. If Canada ratifies the Convention, alterations must
occur in order for the treaty to be successfully applied. First, the Con-
vention would have to mandate that Canadian courts grant disclosure
orders rather than permit the courts to use discretion.123 Second, Arti-
cle 11 would integrate the evidence provisions of each provincial juris-
* diction.12 Third, the Evidence Act of Ontario allows a court to execute
letters of request.1 28 Article 2 of the Convention establishes a separate
process for executing letters of request and appointing officials to super-
vise procedures. Moreover, ratification of the Convention will lead to a
separate process for letters of request and court appointments of super-
vision. The Convention may include Canada, but most likely this appli-
cation will fail.
Generally, foreign nations can circumvent the Convention. The
Convention allows parties to refuse to disclose information, by invoking
a privilege under the law of the executing state.1 26 The United King-
dom declared that it has the right, under Article 23 of the Conven-
tion, 2' to choose not to execute letters of request. The reason for this
declaration possibly is British disenchantment with the expansive pre-
trial procedures and evidence gathering sanctions of the United
States. 128 Thus, the Convention permits the application of secrecy and
blocking laws to avoid compliance with disclosure laws. The implemen-
tation of the Convention may remove some of the barriers to obtaining
121. See Von Mehren, supra note .114, at 992 (analyzing the effectiveness of the
convention in judicial proceedings).
122. Myrick and Love, supra note 72, at 613.
123. See Hague Convention, supra note 113, at Art. 12 (establishing that the
Convention makes it mandatory for a court to require disclosure of evidence). Specifi-
cally, Article 12(b) would limit the public policy argument of refusing to grant letters
of request to protecting the sovereignty of Canada. Id.
124. Id. at 614.
125. See id. at 612-13.
126. Id. at 614.
127. See id. at 594 (citing Article 23 of the Hague Convention which provides:
"A Contracting State may at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare
that it will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial
discovery of documents as known in common Law countries.")
128. See Myrick and Love, supra note 72, at 594 (examining foreign nations'
agitation towards United States procedures and how they apply the Hague Convention
in order to circumvent these measures).
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evidence but also may create new problems.
b. Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements
The United States, in an attempt to eliminate the barriers of
blocking and secrecy laws, began cooperating with other market link
countries through the development of separate mutual assistance trea-
ties. 2 9 The United States and Canada enacted a Memorandum of Un-
derstanding (the 1984 Understanding) in 1984, reaffirming their mu-
tual commitment to cooperation in matters related to the
internationalization of the securities markets.1" 0 Recently, the United
Kingdom entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the
United States that allows parties to obtain evidence in a cooperative
manner."'1
The 1984 Understanding between Canada and the United
States13 purports to eliminate the possibility of misunderstandings." 3
To accomplish this goal, the 1984 Understanding establishes proce-
dures for consultation with, and advance notification of, each coun-
try.3" Furthermore, the agreement addresses restricted access to evi-
dence in anti-trust suits. The agreement enables the United States and
Canada to solve conflicts between disclosure obligations and the secur-
ity of national interests."' Moreover, a provision exists to minimize
129. See Olsen, supra note 112, at 1009-10 (discussing the United States negotia-
tion with various countries which have secrecy and/or blocking laws).
130. See Comment, The Canada-United States Memorandum of Understanding
Regarding Application of National Antitrust Law: New Guidelines for Resolution of
Multinational Antitrust Enforcement Disputes, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1066, 1067
(1984-85) [hereinafter Northwestern Comment] (examining the establishment of an
agreement between Canada and the United States with respect to international
transactions).
131. See also infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text (examining the Memo-
randum of Understanding with respect to interactions between the United States and
the United Kingdom).
132. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of Canada as to Notification, Consultation,
and Cooperation with Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws, re-
printed in 23 I.L.M. 275 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Understanding].
133. Northwestern Comment, supra note 130, at 1086.
134. Id. These specific guidelines should be extremely helpful in diminishing con-
flicts in antitrust transactions. Id. at 1088-89 (analyzing the notification and consulta-
tion guidelines).
135. Id. at 1093. The 1984 Understanding provides, "[ilf one Party seeks to ob-
tain information located within the territory of the other in furtherance of an antitrust
investigation or inquiry, the other Party will not normally discourage a response." Id.
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conflicts1 " and to encourage mutual cooperation in enforcement,
through exchange of records between the two nations.137 Generally, the
1984 Understanding is a compromise with Canada; Canada agreed not
to restrict disclosure of information, while the United States agreed to
consider the sovereignty of Canada when requesting information." s
The United States and Canada established the Mutual Legal As-
sistance Treaty to regulate their market links. This Treaty provides
procedures to deal with illegal actions arising out of the linkage mecha-
nism. This -agreement's success will depend upon the cooperation of
participating parties.
The market linkage plans need to develop surveillance mecha-
nisms. These mechanisms can only be developed through the coopera-
tion of all nations involved in the proposal.13 9 The linked markets real-
ize that enforcement tactics must be implemented in order for these
linkage proposals to be successful. 4
The BSE-ME linkage proposal includes surveillance mechanisms
for all the future trading market links.141 One method these linked ex-
changes use is cooperative agreements that establish standards of en-
forcement. The BSE and the ME mutual agreements rectify discrepan-
cies in the proposed market linkage plan between these two
exchanges." 2
AMEX and TSE officials worked together to coordinate the sur-
veillance tactics that regulate both exchanges.14 TSE bylaws prohibit
trading through deceptive and fraudulent means.4 ' The Criminal Code
of Canada 4 5 and the Ontario Securities Act control other illegal mar-
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. (describing the major considerations of the 1984 Understanding).
139. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text (discussing surveillance mech-
anisms utilized in internationalization proposals).
140. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text (discussing the implementa-
tion of enforcement tactics with respect to foreign transactions).
141. See Release No. 22442, supra note 16, at 39,203 (discussing the similarities
in surveillance between BSE-ME and AMEX-TSE linkages).
142. See Release No. 21449, supra note 14, at 44,579 (noting the development of
methods to encourage cooperation by the markets in the area of surveillance).
143. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (discussing the surveillance
mechanisms used in the BSE-ME linkage).
144. See Section 11.17 of the Toronto Stock Exchange by-laws (discussing the
fair and equitable principles of trade implemented by the TSE); see also Section 11.26
of by-laws ("Manipulative or Deceptive Methods of Trading") (providing examples of
manipulative and deceptive activities).
145. See Criminal Code, R.S.C., §§ 338(2), 340, 341 (1980) (discussing the ap-
plication of Canadian laws to illegal securities transactions).
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ket activities. 14 The Ontario Securities Commission and the SEC en-
tered into an agreement, through an exchange of letters, to cooperate
with surveillance of American and Canadian markets. Although the
SEC and the Ontario Securities Commission have cooperated in the
past,1"" the SEC seeks to prevent the application of the Canadian
blocking statute. The statute limits investigations in foreign transac-
tions involving Canada or Canadian citizens. 148 The Parliament of
Canada passed the blocking statute in the Foreign Extraterritorial
Measures Act (FEMA)." 9 Through the cooperative efforts of both ex-
changes as well as the enforcement agencies, the securities transactions
taking place through the linkage proposals may be regulated. 150
The surveillance procedures of the MSE-TSE linkage, discussed in
the Memorandum, 51 establish guidelines to maintain fairness and an
orderly market.152 In addition, the SEC and the OSC plan to continue
their cooperative relationship that developed through the other market
links (BSE-ME and AMEX-TSE) between Canada and the United
States. 153 Furthermore, the Canadian laws regarding fraud also apply
with respect to the MSE-TSE linkage.' 54
The United Kingdom followed Canada's approach. The United
Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry signed a Memorandum of
146. See Ontario Securities Act, Part XXII ("Civil Liability") (applying the Ca-
nadian securities laws to fraudulent activities).
147. See Release No. 22442, supra note 16, at 39,203 (explaining which United
States laws apply to illegal securities transactions). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1982),
the United States Federal district court may assist foreign courts in discovery efforts.
Id.
148. Id.
149. See Toronto Letter, supra note 2 (applying the Canadian blocking statute to
international transactions). FEMA authorizes the Canadian Attorney General to pre-
vent the disclosure of information to foreign jurisdictions and to prevent any Canadian
person from complying with foreign laws and orders. The Attorney General implements
the blocking statute if these actions "adversely affectis] significant Canadian interests
in relation to international trade or commerce involving a business carried on in whole
or in part in Canada or that otherwise infringes Canadian sovereignty." See id. (com-
menting on the utilization of the Canadian blocking laws); see also Release No. 22442,
supra note 16, at 39,204 (describing the implementation and exemptions of the Cana-
dian blocking statute in securities transactions).
150. See id. (illustrating that a method of reducing problems in enforcement
among the various linked markets is through a mutual understanding of the differing
statutes).
151. Release No. 23075, supra note 16, at 11,858. The Memorandum establishes
an agreement to develop a series of surveillance tactics. Id.
152. Id.
153. See id. (evaluating the implications of using FEMA in market links).
154. Id.
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Understanding (MOU) with the SEC on September 23, 1986.155 The
MOU creates a reciprocal assistance program in which a country can
gain access to informati6n through voluntary cooperation."' The agree-
ment applies to investigations and market surveillance. Specifically, the
agreement covers market manipulation, insider trading, requirements
for financial institutions and securities transaction misrep-
resentations.15 7
The SEC, however, is concerned about surveillance and access to
regulatory information in this linkage.15 8 NASD responds that the LSE
will cooperate in the disclosure of information, investigations, and other
observations of mutual market transactions.5 9 The SEC is specifically
concerned with the United Kingdom's blocking laws. 1 0 The Protection
of Trading Interests Act of 1980181 allows the British government to
curtail the disclosure of documents or information between the United
Kingdom and a foreign jurisdiction. The SEC believes that this statute
may impede any transaction between the United States and the United
Kingdom.' The SEC, therefore, believes that the NASD and LSE
must come to an agreement regarding the implementation of the Brit-
ish blocking laws prior to the establishment of links between these two
markets, in order to regulate the linkage transaction.'6 3
These agreements are an initial step in developing a comprehen-
155. See Memorandum from Gary Lynch, Director, Division of Enforcement, to
Chairman Shad (February 6, 1987) [hereinafter Lynch Memo] (describing the bilat-
eral agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States regarding mutual
disclosure of information).
156. Id.; see infra notes 194-224 and accompanying text (evaluating the concept
of waiver by conduct).
157. See Lynch Memo, supra note 155.
158. See Release No. 23158, supra note 42, at 15,990 (recognizing the surveil-
lance problems that arise from the implementation of market links).
159. See id. (describing the cooperative efforts taken by the exchanges to reduce
surveillance problems). The NASD-LSE agreement provides for access to the regula-
tory items of the other party, inevitably benefitting the linkage plan. Id.
160. Id. In the case of the linkage between Canadian and United States ex-
changes, the AMEX and the TSE agreed to apply the blocking laws only in unusual
circumstances. Id.; see also supra notes 129-154 and accompanying text (analyzing the
market linkage agreements between Canada and the United States in order to reduce
the differences between these two countries).
161. Release No. 23158, supra note 42, at 15,990.
162. Id.
163. Id. The LSE began to harmonize its disclosure laws with other member na-
tions of the EEC which may eventually lead to greater uniformity in the laws among
the linkage countries. See Whitman & Ransom Letter, supra note 40 (recognizing the
United Kingdom's attempt to reconcile differences in its disclosure laws with the laws
of various other nations).
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sive understanding and fostering cooperation in the regulation of secur-
ities transactions among the Canadian-United States and United
States-United Kingdom market links. The reliance on voluntary coop-
eration, however, may jeopardize the success of the MOU. Therefore,
additional devices for obtaining evidence from the United Kingdom and
Canada are warranted, to deter the application of blocking laws.
C. Litigation: The Procedure for Obtaining Information
Despite voluntary cooperation, the Hague Evidence Convention,
and bilateral and multilateral treaties, evidence is often obtained
through litigation. 64 Litigation is generally pursued after the SEC es-
tablishes a cause of action. Discovery is initiated and promoted through
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When discovery is sought from
unwilling third parties in foreign nations, non-disclosure laws may cur-
tail the investigation. Initially, when a United States litigator goes
against a foreigner, he should consider the applicable United States
laws and rules, foreign law and practice, and any pertinent treaties. 6 5
After the commencement of the suit, the court may serve a sub-
poena upon the parties to request disclosure of information. 66 In order
to have authority under international law, a foreign nation may require
a citizen to give testimony through a properly served subpoena.' 67 If
the parties fail to comply with the subpoena, the SEC can petition the
court to order the disclosure or requested documentation under Rule 37
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 168 If the parties ignore this
court order, the court may impose sanctions. Parties could be fined,
held in contempt, or barred from introducing evidence. 69
The courts use a balancing test to determine whether they will
164. Myrick & Love, supra note 72, at 586.
165. See Myrick & Love, supra note 72, at 587 (describing the litigation proce-
dure when dealing with foreign parties).
166. See Consolidated Rendering, 207 U.S. 541, 552 (1908); In re Equitable Plan
Co., 185 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), modified on other grounds; Ings v. Ferguson,
282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 72 F. Supp.
1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
167. See Myrick and Love, supra note 72, at 588. Congress enacted the Walsh
Act to allow courts to exercise this control over foreign citizens. This Act requires
foreign nationals to be present and testify or reveal any information and documents
requested by a court order and properly served subpoena. See id. (describing the proce-
dure used to obtain evidence abroad).
168. FED. R. Civ. P. 37; see Policing Internationalized U.S. Capital Markets,
supra note 48, at 97 (examining the application of Rule 37 to obtaining evidence from
foreign parties).
169. Policing Internationalized U.S. Capital Markets, supra note 48, at 97.
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issue an order requiring disclosure of information. 17 0 SEC v. Banca
Della Svizzera Italiana (the "St. Joe" case) shows how a Swiss bank
with offices in the United States may be compelled to reveal its custom-
ers' identities. The Banca Della Svizzera Italiana (BSI) failed to com-
ply with the SEC's request for disclosure. BSI claimed the request vio-
lated Swiss secrecy laws.' 7 1 The court applied section 40 of the
Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations," 2 balancing the vital na-
tional interests of a country against the hardship this decision imposes
on the individuals involved.173 BSI, fearful of the possibility of signifi-
cant fines, received a waiver of the secrecy laws from its principles,
allowing it to disclose the requested information.' 7 " The application of
Rule 37 and, in particular, the balancing test of section 40 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Foreign Relations in these cases is extremely
170. See id. at 97-98 (explaining the process used by the court in applying Rule
37 in obtaining information from foreign financial institutions); see also SEC v. Banca
Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (analyzing how the commis-
sion circumvented secrecy laws of Switzerland in order to enforce compliance of the
United States discovery procedures).
171. SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. at 111. The Banca Della
Svizzera Italiana (BSI), which had subsidiaries in the United States, refused to dis-
close the identity of its customers, as well as other pertinent data, in a transaction
involving BSI's purchase of common stock and call options of common stock in St. Joe
Minerals Corporation. Id. at 11. The SEC claimed that insider trading occurred dur-
ing the transaction of the St. Joe's stock purchase. The SEC obtained an order from
the court to compel BSI to divulge the identity of its customers. Id. at 113. BSI, how-
ever, did not disclose this information claiming this request violated their bank secrecy
laws. The court then entered a motion stating that if BSI did not comply with the
previous court order, then contempt sanctions would be imposed. Id. at 112-14.
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §40 (1965): Limitations
on Exercise of Enforcement Jurisdiction:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the
rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person,
each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating
the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as:
(a) vital national interests of each of the states;
(b) the extent and nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement ac-
tions would impose upon the person;
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of
the other state;
(d) the nationality of the person; and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably
be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
173. SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. at 117.
174. See Policing Internationalized U.S. Capital Markets, supra note 48, at 98
(examining the court's ruling and results of the St. Joe case).
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beneficial. 1"" Despite the success rate of using section 40, potential for-
eign violators will continue to use their blocking or secrecy laws unless
the fear of court action deters them.
Canadian evidence laws are not as complicated and do not hinder
foreign litigants to the same extent as laws in other countries. The
blocking laws are the only barriers to the evidence gathering process.
Generally, foreign parties can obtain data without the intervention of a
Canadian court, through the application of the United States Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 28(b). 7'
All Canadian proceedings are controlled under the jurisdiction of a
specific cause of action under the British North America Act. 7 Each
province establishes its own provincial courts, that impose penalties and
fines and enforce the provincial laws. The federal government has the
power only to protect rights under the federal laws and to enact crimi-
nal provisions.' 7 8
A Canadian attorney, however, may obtain evidence through an
application to the Canadian court for an order under section 43 of the
Canada Evidence Act.'7 9 In addition, section 2 of the Canada Evidence
Act covers all civil, criminal, and any other proceedings within the ju-
risdiction of the Parliament of Canada. 80 Furthermore, section 37 of
the Canada Evidence Act extends to the courts an evidentiary author-
ity despite the legislative authority of the Canadian Parliament."' Be-
cause the provinces can apply their own evidence provisions, such as
those for the Province of Ontario, 8 2 an application can be founded on
either federal or provincial laws.' 83
In the United Kingdom, the civil court procedures are complex."
175. See id. at 98 (examining the results of numerous cases and the varying suc-
cess rate of the application of Rule 37).
176. FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b).
177. The British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., ch. 3, § 92(14) (Can.).
178. Myrick and Love, supra note 72, at 609.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 610.
182. See id. (explaining how Chapter 151, Section 60, of the Ontario Revised
Statutes provides a statutory basis for obtaining evidence specifically related to the
Ontario province).
183. See id. (citing Medical Ancillary Servs. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 23 Ont. 2d
406 (1979), which ruled that although both Acts may be utilized, the court generally
prefers to apply the Ontario Act in civil suits).
184. Id. at 597. The English court distinguishes between evidence and discovery.
Depositions and other statements may be obtained voluntarily. When evidence cannot
be obtained through an agreement, English courts require, however, the initiation of
certain procedures. Id.
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English courts follow the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions)
Act, 1975 (the 1975 Act),185 and Orders 39 and 70 of the Rules of the
Supreme Court (R.S.C.) 186 to obtain evidence.187 Initially, the litigator
should explain the rationale for seeking evidence abroad and must spec-
ify which documents are to be revealed. 88 The English court then has
the discretion to grant or deny1 89 the request under the 1975 Act.1 90
Once the request is granted, the party desiring the evidence must go to
the designated central authority to obtain an affidavit which sets forth
the details regarding the type of evidence to be obtained and the rea-
185. Id. (presenting the application of the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Juris-
dictions) Act).
186. Id.
187. See id. (examining the governing law and procedural rules pertaining to evi-
dence gathering).
188. See id. at 599 (describing the procedure used in obtaining evidence in the
United Kingdom). The English court may subpoena a witness or third party to testify
at trial. Unlike the U.S. practice these documents may not be inspected before the
trial. Id.
189. See Myrick & Love, supra note 72, at 601-02 (noting the power of the court
to permit or set aside an order). The court may deny orders requiring disclosure of
evidence if they are oppressive or based on the lack of relevant material the witness
may give, the protected privilege of the evidence, insufficient particularized documents,
or the lack of proper procedures employed in obtaining the request. Id.
190. See id. at 599 (discussing the Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions)
Act). Requests may be written or oral under Section 2(2) of the 1975 Act which states:
Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) above but subject to the pro-
visions of this section, an order under this section may, in particular, make
provision-
(a) for the examination of witnesses, either orally or in writing;
(b) for the production of documents;
(c) for the inspection, photographing, preservation, custody, or detention of
any property;
(d) for the taking of samples of any property and the carrying out of any
experiments on or with any property;
(e) for the medical examination of any person;
(f) without prejudice to paragraph (e) above, for the taking and testing of
samples of blood from any person.
Id. at 600.
Section 2(4) bars certain types of discovery:
An order under this Section shall not require a person-
(a) to state what documents relevant to the proceedings to which the applica-
tion for the order relates are or have been in his possession, custody or power; or
(b) to produce any documents other than particular documents specified in
the order as being documents appearing to the court making the order to be, to be
likely to be, in his possession, custody or power.
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sons for the importance of this evidence. 91 Blocking laws, such as the
Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980,192 however, may be in-
voked to bar any disclosure of information. 193
D. Waiver By Conduct Approach
John Fedders, former Director of the Division of Enforcement at
the SEC, addressed1 94 the problems that result when foreign parties
participate in transactions in the United States and then apply their
secrecy or blocking laws to circumvent American discovery laws."'5 His
"waiver by conduct" proposal would have required that a purchase or
sale of securities from abroad, in a domestic market, be characterized
as constructive consent to the disclosure of any relevant materials
needed in an enforcement investigation. 96 The underlying rationale
was that a state long arm statute extends to an international forum and
gives that state jurisdiction. Any participant would waive all rights to
191. Id. at 600-01 (describing the application process given to the English court).
192. See id. at 602 (citing the Protection of Trading Interest Act, 1980).
193. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text (describing the British block-
ing laws, the Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, and the objectives of this
legislation).
194. See Waiver by Conduct, supra note 48; Fedders, Foreign Secrecy: A Key to
the Lock, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1983, § 3, at 2, col. 3; Fedders & Mann, Waiver by
Conduct vs. Fraud, Wall St. J., Dec. 21, 1984, at 18, col. 4. The SEC unanimously
commented to Congress that Fedders' proposal of waiver by conduct should receive
legislative consideration, but the Commission was apprehensive about this policy and
thus remained neutral on this matter. See SEC Issues Release Seeking Comments on
"Waiver by Conduct" Legislation, [July-Dec.] 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1285
[hereinafter Waiver by Conduct Release] (commenting on the SEC's opinions of the
implementation of the waiver by conduct proposal); SEC Moves on Bank Plan, N.Y.
Times, July 27, 1984, at D6, col. 6. (examining the reaction of the SEC to the possible
effects of Fedders' idea). To further the SEC's investigation on the application of
waiver by conduct on transactions in which foreign nations imposed their secrecy or
blocking laws, the Commission issued a release for comment. See Request for Com-
ments Concerning a Concept to Improve the Commission's Ability to Investigate and
Prosecute Persons Who Purchase or Sell Securities in the U.S. Markets from Other
Countries, Release No. 21186, [July-Dec.] 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1305 (Aug.
3, 1984) (requesting comments in order to advance their opinion on the concept). The
SEC, however, did not endorse the waiver by conduct proposition because of "factual,
legal and policy questions that require further evaluation." Id.
195. Waiver by Conduct Release, supra note 194, at 1311.
196. Karmel, supra note 93, at 109; see Waiver by Conduct Release, supra note
194, at 1311 (commenting on the SEC's involvement in extraterritorial jurisdictional
situations); see also Release No. 6568, supra note 2, at 9284 (encouraging discussion
regarding the enforcement of the jurisdictional problems through the implementation
of "waiver by conduct").
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limit enforcement of a judgment arising out of a transaction in a for-
eign nation's market.
Specifically, under waiver by conduct, any securities transaction in
a United States market would act as an irrevocable consent to compli-
ance with a United States court order and administrative investigations
that require disclosure of information. 197 The waiver, however, would
be limited to evidence relevant to the transaction, the purchaser or
seller, or the actual securities and proceeds of the transaction. 9 ' The
proposal would allow the foreign law of the foreign participant to gov-
ern the proceedings, 99 and the statutory rules would govern the
method of notification for the parties. 00 In terms of the adequacy of
notice, the SEC commented that additional notice would encourage
greater compliance with this waiver proposal by foreign governments
and courts.20
The waiver by conduct proposal would invoke the implied waiver
when the broker-dealer's order ticket was presented, thus informing the
specific financial institution that a transaction had occurred. 202 The for-
eign financial institution could then accept the validity of the cus-
tomer's implied waiver or turn to its government or courts. A court
could issue an order granting permission for disclosure of the evidence.
If, however, the foreign government did not accept the validity of the
consent, the SEC would have to petition a United States court for an
order requiring disclosure. If the SEC could obtain a waiver, the court
would grant the order. The balancing principles in Restatement Section




201. See id. (commenting on the various methods of notice to insure greater ac-
ceptance of the proposal). Furthermore, the legislation may impose sanctions to force
parties to reveal the requested documents. These sanctions include the following:
[lmpoundment or withholding of any dividends or interest payable to the
person by a U.S. issuer; revocation or suspension of voting rights with respect to
securities of any U.S. issuer involved in the Commission's investigation; an order
to any U.S. issuer or transfer agent to refrain from effecting a registration or
transfer with respect to a particular purchase or sale by any person having an
interest in the securities involved; an order directing a U.S. issuer to suspend the
subject person from serving as an officer or director of the issuer; a decree prohib-
iting any U.S. broker or dealer known to have effected transactions on behalf of
the person to refrain from effecting such transactions in the future; and an order
providing such other relief as the court may deem necessary or appropriate under
the circumstances.
Id. 1313-14.
202. Id. at 1311.
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40 would be substituted by the waiver by conduct principle if the court
found that the law enforcement issues outweigh the foreign state's sov-
ereignty interests.203
Fedders proposed waiver by conduct because he saw this approach
as beneficial in reducing the problems that arise with multinational se-
curities market links, 204 specifically when foreign nations invoke their
blocking and secrecy laws. This waiver proposal would protect the in-
tegrity and reputation of the United States securities markets by giving
American courts the authority to control foreign transactions on do-
mestic exchanges. 20 5 In addition, this concept would reduce conflicts
between foreign nations and the United States.20  Furthermore, the
proposal would be efficient and cost effective. 0
First, waiver by conduct would protect United States markets by
deterring investors from making fraudulent trades within the market
links. Foreign investors would be unable to circumvent domestic en-
forcement tactics through secrecy and/or blocking laws. In addition,
the discovery process would be more efficient because this proposal
would permit the SEC to gather information with greater ease. With
the reduction of fraudulent actions and the increased supervision of the
exchanges, investors would become more confident trading within the
market links. This positive impression portrayed by the exchanges
would promote the integrity of the markets in the United States, en-
couraging future capital investments.
Second, waiver by conduct would reduce tension among the linked
nations. The plan is narrow in application, because it compels foreign
investors to disclose only the documents relevant to a transaction, al-
lowing any supplemental information to be protected under the secrecy
or blocking statutes of a country.20 8 The foreign nations would feel that
203. See id. at 1312 (discussing the procedures for applying waiver by conduct
principles in United States courts).
204. See supra notes 14-47 and accompanying text (describing the international-
ization of the securities markets through the proposal of market links).
205. See Waiver by Conduct Release, supra note 194, at 1309 (discussing the
benefits of waiver by conduct in giving the United States jurisdiction over foreigners
conduct in its securities markets); see also Waiver by Conduct Release, supra note
194, at 1314 (recognizing the potential advantages to be gained through the application
of waiver by conduct).
206. Waiver by Conduct Release, supra note 194, at 1314 n.43.
207. See Spencer, The Reaction of the Securities and Exchange Commission to
the Internationalization of the Securities Markets: Three Concept Releases, 4 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 11, 113 (1986) (discussing the efficiency aspect of the waiver by conduct
approach).
208. See Waiver by Conduct Release, supra note 194, at 1315 (examining how
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the United States is infringing less upon their state sovereignty, thus
promoting greater cooperation among the involved nations." 9
Third, waiver by conduct would reduce costly measures that pres-
ently are utilized to obtain evidence from foreign parties. Specifically,
fewer cases would be litigated, saving time, money, and other resources
needed to investigate fraudulent transaction suits. Furthermore, no ma-
jor alterations of existing procedures would be required.
Despite benefits which might result from the implementation of
Fedders' proposal, there are potential disadvantages. One problem is
the extraterritoriality of the United States securities laws. Second, the
United States courts would impose waiver by conduct unilaterally. This
procedure would create tension among the nations involved.21 0 These
disadvantages make the proposal ineffective.
First, the waiver by conduct concept may be seen as a way for
United States regulators to intervene in the domestic affairs of a for-
eign country. 11 Foreign countries would view the proposal as an extra-
territorial application of United States securities laws. Initially, the
proposition diminishes the significance of foreign laws, specifically
blocking and secrecy provisions. 12 Furthermore, this approach allows
the United States to secure evidence either without receiving the ex-
press consent of the foreign country or without any consideration for
the secrecy or blocking laws.21 3 Moreover, foreign nations may con-
clude that waiver by conduct gives United States courts too much con-
trol over transactions occurring in a foreign jurisdiction. 4 Even if the
approach properly establishes that an individual waived his interest in
the waiver by conduct proposal may preserve the foreign national sovereignty while
permitting the application of United States extraterritorial laws).
209. Id. at 1314 n. 44.
210. See Spencer, supra note 207, at 113 (noting the unilateral concept of the
waiver by conduct approach).
211. Letter from the law firm of Baker & McKenzie to Shirley E. Hollis, Acting
Secretary, SEC (Nov. 29, 1984) (Comment on SEC Release No. 21186, File No. S7-
27-84 "Waiver by Conduct").
212. Id.
213. See Letter from Guenther van Well, the Ambassador of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, at 8 (Dec. 10, 1984) (Comment on SEC Release No. 21186, File No.
S7-27-84 "Waiver by Conduct") (commenting on how the waiver by conduct proposal
infringes upon the sovereignty of foreign nations).
214. See Letter from Jon-Jo A. Douglas, Investigation Counsel, to John F.
Leybourne, Deputy Director, Enforcement, Ontario Securities Commission at 4 (Nov.
1, 1984) (Comment on SEC Release No. 21186, File No. S7-27-84 "Waiver by Con-
duct") (stating that not only will United States courts control proceedings within its
jurisdiction, but will also project this concept of waiver in securities transactions to
suits in other countries).
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confidentiality and his right not to produce evidence, this privilege may
belong to the state.215
Second, the unilateral aspect of Fedders' approach would produce
tension between the United States and the foreign nations."' This fric-
tion could hinder the enforcement tactics of the SEC by undermining
cooperative efforts made by foreign nations.217 These efforts are essen-
tial to any proposal. 21 8 Furthermore, countries may retaliate and enact
harsher secrecy or blocking laws, 2 9 may prevent United States inves-
tors from participating in their markets,220 or may send foreign inves-
tors to other international markets, where this problem will not arise. 21
The problems with Fedders' proposition would make it ineffective
in accomplishing its intent. Foreign governments and courts would
challenge its validity and thus impose their blocking and secrecy laws.
Also, foreign issuers could circumvent waiver by conduct through the
use of an additional layer of financial institutions to disguise the iden-
tity of purchasers or sellers.222
215. See Spencer, supra note 207, at 114 (illustrating the problems arising from
the implementation of the waiver by conduct approach); Waiver by Conduct Release,
supra note 194, at 1316 (suggesting that private parties may not waive laws that are
national interests); see also supra notes 48-80 and accompanying text (describing the
concept of blocking laws and the confidentiality issue founded upon these laws).
216. See Ingersoll, SEC Proposal to Override Foreign Laws on Bank Secrecy
Draws Wide Criticism, Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1985, at 13, col. 1 (quoting critics who
warn that the ratification of this approach would augment bilateral conflicts).
217. See Letter from Charles H. Ross, Jr., Chairman, Merrill Lynch Interna-
tional, Inc. at 2 (Nov. 29, 1984) (Comment on SEC Release No. 21186, File No. S7-
27-84 "Waiver by Conduct") (recognizing the retaliatory actions foreign countries
might take against the extraterritorial application of United States laws); Cockwell
Letter, supra note 48, at 11-13 (exemplifying foreign responses to United States court
proceedings involving secrecy and blocking laws).
218. See infra notes 237-252 and accompanying text (proposing the need for co-
operation in order to diminish any conflicts involved in the implementation of the inter-
nationalization of the securities markets).
219. Cockwell Letter, supra note 48, at 11-13.
220. Id. at 13. Letter from Mary Condeelis, Executive Director, Bankers' Associa-
tion for Foreign Trade (Nov. 30, 1984) (Comment on SEC Release No. 21186, File
No. S7-27-84 "Waiver by Conduct").
221. See Spencer, supra note 207, at 114 (illustrating a major opposition to the
waiver by conduct approach). For example, a London investor, who does not want to be
forced into disclosing information, may choose to trade in the Tokyo market rather
than be confronted with the waiver by conduct law in the United States. Id.
222. Letter from Robert V. Roosa, Committee Chairman, Advisory Committee on
International Capital Markets to the NYSE Board of Directors, N.Y. Stock Exchange,
at 1-2 (Nov. 7, 1984) (Comment on SEC Release No. 21186, File No. S7-27-84
"Waiver by Conduct").
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Although initially waiver by conduct appears to alleviate the con-
flict between the discovery proceedings in the United States and foreign
secrecy and blocking laws, the proposal contains too many policy de-
fects to be successful.223 Other nations will not comply with its terms
and might retaliate with defensive tactics.2  Therefore, the implemen-
tation of this proposal would harm rather than benefit the United
States and could harm foreign relations. These disadvantages, among
others, make the proposal ineffective and unacceptable.
V. DEALING WITH BLOCKING LAWS IN THE CONTEXT OF MARKET
LINKS
Securities transactions are destined to transpire within an interna-
tional framework.225 At their inaugural stage, the linkage proposals are
the best option for internationalizing the securities markets.226 Market
links can establish a foundation for the future.227 Eventually, the
linkage proposals may expand to incorporate 24-hour around-the-world
trading. Internationalization plans will benefit foreign investors and is-
suers, yet problems will arise from the implementation of these plans.
Issuers and investors alike will gain economic advantages from in-
ternational securities transactions. International trading will ultimately
223. See Liftin, Our Playing Field, Our Rules: An Analysis of the SEC's Waiver
By Conduct Approach, 11 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 525, 555-56 (1985) (concluding that
the proposal is legally faulty and could never actually achieve its objectives); Ingersoll,
supra note 216, at 13, col. 1 (commenting on the criticism of the SEC's consideration
of waiver by conduct proposal).
224. See supra notes 194-224 and accompanying text (describing the measures
foreign nations would undertake to counter the application of waiver by conduct).
225. Release No. 21958, supra note 2, at 16,302.
226. Letter from B. Imseng, Chairman and K. Menche, Secretary, International
Symposium of Securities Administrators (ISSA) to John Wheeler, Secretary, SEC
(Jun. 25, 1985); Release No. 21958, supra note 2. The TSE prefers the linkage plan
between markets over a proposal of a single international market. Id.; see also NASD
Letter, supra note 4 (commenting on which would be the best proposal to implement);
Letter from Walter R. Diehl, Jr., Vice President and Associate General Counsel, ITT
Corporation to John Wheeler, Secretary, SEC (Jun. 27, 1985) (same). Other commen-
tators, however, tend to desire an around-the-clock proposal over a worldwide network
(either a single international market or market linkage). But see Release No. 21958,
supra note 2 (summarizing an alternative position that 24-hour markets would be more
successful than a linkage plan).
227. See Release No. 21958, supra note 2 (suggesting how the present market
linkage proposals will lead to future internationalization plans). Commentators gener-
ally support the linkage proposals even over the development of "a central international
market." Id.
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improve the world capital market.22 8 First, multinational transactions
expand investment opportunities. 9 Second, extended trading arrange-
ments give investors the opportunity to make offerings when regional
exchanges are closed. 30 International market links will eliminate in-
termediaries, expedite the exchange process, and reduce transaction
costs. Linkages will allow investors to buy at the best price and pro-
mote greater liquidity among markets.23 1 Furthermore, the ability of
corporations to invest in foreign markets improves their portfolios.2 32
The internationalization of the securities markets has encouraged regu-
lators and various governments to continue expanding global stock
trading, but barriers have slowed the progress.
Problems surface when foreign nations impose their blocking laws.
These laws hinder the development of an international network. 3
These conflicts can be alleviated by determining which actors will be-
come involved, stipulating qualifications for issuers, harmonizing disclo-
sure standards and surveillance mechanisms, creating multinational
treaties in order to establish a cooperative effort of all who participate,
and developing a formal organization to supervise all international se-
curities transactions.
A. 'Cooperation and Uniformity: The Crucial Elements
Cooperation is the prerequisite for harmonizing the securities laws
and procedures among various nations. 34 Uniformity is also essential to
the harmonization of the laws. Overall, the standards must be higher in
228. See Shad's Speech, supra note 2 (citing the advantages of universal securi-
ties trading).
229. Id. Investors may benefit from increased access to capital from the global
markets. In addition, individuals have the opportunity to participate in multinational
securities transactions. Id.
230. Toronto Letter, supra note 2.
231. AMEX Letter, supra note 9. The letter discusses the advantages specifically
related to the AMEX-TSE link. The internationalization proposal will increase the
membership of both exchanges, reduce intermarket transactional expenses, and benefit
communication between these two exchanges. Id. Overall, United States investors will
benefit from trading on foreign markets. Thomas, Internationalization of the Securities
Markets: An Empirical Analysis, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 155, 167 (1982).
232. See Toronto Letter, supra note 2 (exhibiting the benefits foreign investors
receive through participating at an international level).
233. See SIA Letter, supra note 9 (discussing the problems that arise through the
implementation of proposals for the internationalization of the securities markets).
234. Tokyo Letter, supra note 13. The Tokyo Stock Exchange acknowledges the
differences existing in the present markets but through sharing of information, the sys-
tem may become more secure and uniform. Id.
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order to ensure that those who participate are qualified and devoted to
cooperation in global trading. Harmonizing the laws will allow foreign
investors to profit without taking unfair advantage of domestic inves-
tors. One alternative is third party examinations of certain foreign is-
suers. 23 The best alternative, however, would be an organized system
of mutual understanding in which many governments would par-
ticipate.2 6
The SEC can remain flexible in order for this process of the inter-
nationalization of the securities markets to evolve naturally.23 7 Regula-
tors should require all foreign issuers investing in the United States to
disclose the same information required of domestic investors.2 38 Uni-
form principles will ensure high enforcement standards for all securities
transactions. 3 9 The SEC, however, should reevaluate its policies in or-
der to reduce the barriers, in particular the application of foreign
blocking laws,24 0 that hinder the SEC's investigations of global securi-
ties market transactions. This reappraisal will eliminate unnecessary
laws while stabilizing regulations to ensure fair dealing in international
trading.
Cooperation is crucial in dealing with foreign blocking laws as well
as harmonizing surveillance and enforcement tactics. Recently, the
United States increased its efforts to regulate the securities markets.
Specifically, the SEC began using electronic surveillance systems, im-
posing large penalties, and seeking cooperative support from other na-
tions.24 1 A formalized system of coordinated surveillance must be de-
veloped to ensure stability and fair dealing and to allow the
internationalization of the securities markets to continue. These plans
will be carried out in part through bilateral or multilateral agreements.
The Canadian-United States and the United Kingdom-United States
links are attempts to achieve this type of cooperation.2" 2
235. Williams & Spencer, supra note 2, at 283. This harmonization would be
reached through a process of negotiations between the exchange and the proposed
member. Id.
236. Id.
237. AMEX Letter, supra note 9.
238. Thomas, Increased Access to United States Capital Markets: A Brief Look
at the SEC's New Integrated Disclosure Rules for Foreign Issuers, 5 J. CoMP. Bus. &
CAP. MKT. L. 129, 132 (1983). This requirement enables all investors to be completely
knowledgeable regarding a particular investment. Id.
239. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 240 (statement of Senator Alfonse M.
D'Amato).
240. Id.
241. Shad's Speech, supra note 2, at 9.
242. See AMEX Letter, supra note 9 (discussing the bilateral agreements estab-
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The United States should not relax its enforcement of liability pro-
visions.24 3 The SEC should employ a hard-line approach to policing any
market that United States citizens or corporations enter.24 Control
must be asserted to ensure the disclosure of information and the en-
forcement of regulatory policies. 45
Cooperation should exist in both disclosure and surveillance. 24"
Nations should reach formal agreements. Members of the participating
exchanges should establish a surveillance organization.247 Unifying the
regulatory agencies, however, may be difficult because the various na-
tions have different regulatory procedures and some regulate only
states or provinces. Nonetheless, some degree of uniformity, through
cooperation, must be the goal of the internationalization process, in or-
der to ensure that the best interests of all nations are protected.
B. Enforcing Cooperation and Uniformity: Bilateral and
Multilateral Agreements
Many organizations support the development of bilateral or multi-
lateral treaties.24 8 Treaties are often used to enforce agreements made
lished to deal with surveillance situations). This method has already been implemented
with the linkage proposals between the United States and Canada. Id. But see Merrill
Lynch Letter, supra note 9 (suggesting that only certain markets have the ability to
cooperate with the requirements from other foreign regulatory agencies, making for-
eign linkage proposals difficult to manage). Merrill Lynch believes it would be difficult
to get all the investors to follow another country's requirements. Id. The Canadian
regulatory commission's cooperation demonstrates that the OSC is not only willing to
cooperate with the SEC in terms of investigations in its own province, but also willing
to assist in gaining access to documents present in other provinces in Canada although
its investigatory authority reaches only to those located in the interior of Ontario. Re-
lease No. 22442, supra note 16, at 39,205.
243. See Whitman & Ransom Letter, supra note 40 (suggesting that high stan-
dards should be set for liability provisions). This view is based upon a public policy
rationale in that all investors should know the laws of the country in which they choose
to invest. Id.
244. See Karmel, supra note 93, at 109 (implying a stricter stance in regulating
international securities transactions).
245. Id.
246. Release No. 21958, supra note 2. The CBT, Amsterdam Stock Exchange,
Toronto Stock Exchange and AMEX stress their desire for mutual agreements. The
Tokyo Stock Exchange suggests the close surveillance of individual exchanges and the
trading of information regarding multinational listed securities. Id.
247. Id.
248. See Release No. 21958, supra note 2 (consolidating comments by The Trea-
sury, AMEX, ABA, SIA, National Companies, and the Securities Commission of Aus-
tralia (NCSC) who support the development of treaties in order to ensure cooperation
among those nations involved in international securities transactions).
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between countries.2 49 The SEC attempts to negotiate agreements with
foreign governments, imposing surveillance mechanisms through the
cooperation of all interested countries desiring to enforce securities
laws.250
Bilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements will help to alle-
viate problems arising from discrepancies in disclosure laws and en-
forcement, of the securities laws.2"" Bilateral agreements help nations to
cooperate" 2 and enable multinational securities trading to increase
without jeopardizing market fairness. An effective method for avoiding
illegal securities transactions would be the implementation of a treaty
such as the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (MACM).
Multinational treaties could also establish a multinational organi-
zation charged with supervising all securities transactions as well as
future developments in existing internationalization agreements.25 A
worldwide regulatory commission may be necessary to uniformly con-
trol not only domestic but also foreign transactions. 4 Those govern-
ments agreeing to a bilateral or multilateral treaty would not only be
bound to follow the laws set down in their agreements but also the
policies of the international securities organizations.
These organizations may become a strong, cohesive group, able to
deal with problems of the internationalization of the securities mar-
kets.215 5 Today, organizations provide an international forum for securi-
ties transactions. The Federation of International Stock Exchanges pro-
motes cooperation among the member stock exchanges and associations
of stock exchanges .2 6 The International Association of Securities Com-
249. Greene, U.S. Enforcement in International Cases, 16 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1,
49-51 (1986) (discussing the agreement between the United States and Switzerland
that illustrates the benefit of bilateral treaties in enforcing cooperation when disparities
exist in the laws of various nations). The MOU is an example of how two countries
rectified certain discrepancies, specifically problems with the Swiss blocking laws,
through the establishment of bilateral agreements.
250. Release No. 21958, supra note 2, at 16,305; see supra notes 194-224 and
accompanying text (discussing the concept and application of "waiver by conduct").
251. See Shad's Speech, supra note 2, at 9 (emphasizing that these bilateral or
multilateral agreements must respect the individual standards of every nation
involved).
252. Id.
253. Williams & Spencer, supra note 2, at 284.
254. Karmel, supra note 93, at 106. The organizations that are present now, such
as the International Association of Securities Commissions, concentrate on assisting
and educating the exchanges, whereas the international regulatory organization would
regulate multinational transactions. Id.
255. Toronto Letter, supra note 2.
256. Id. This organization involves a membership of over 30 stock exchanges and
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missions and similar organizations also supervise world-wide mar-
kets.257 These organizations, however, act more as counselors than as
international regulatory agencies.
An International Committee of Securities Regulators may be es-
tablished to informally regulate international securities transactions.258
This informal committee, however, would not effectively manage inter-
national securities transactions. An international judicial body may en-
joy more prestige and have more authority to harmonize disparities
among international markets as well as decide questions of law and
jurisdiction. 5 9 This organization would take an enforcement role, with-
out overstepping individual countries' regulatory control over domestic
affairs.2 0
The SEC should encourage the creation of a multinational com-
mission of multinational regulatory agencies. 61 In some of the linkage
proposals, such as the Memorandum,2 62 a six-member joint committee
would establish linkages and monitor the operation of the markets.2 63
Currently linked countries realize the importance of international regu-
lation, cooperation, and uniformity. This understanding must expand
and become more sophisticated as the internationalization proposals
develop.
C. Ensuring Cooperation and Uniformity: Qualifying Factors
Required for Participation
In order to secure the cooperation and enforcement of bilateral
and multilateral agreements, the exchanges and regulatory agencies
stock exchange associations throughout the globe. Id. The Federation established mini-
mum listing standards regarding disclosure for foreign issuers. Pozen (Disclosure),
supra note 1, at 89.
257. Toronto Letter, supra note 2. This organization is a forum for regulatory
agencies to evaluate the supervision of various securities markets. Id.
258. See Williams & Spencer, supra note 2, at 284 (suggesting the establishment
of an informal international organization to control global markets).
259. See Interview, supra note 9 (suggesting the benefit of multinational
committees).
260. Williams & Spencer, supra note 2, at 285.
261. Whitman & Ransom Letter, supra note 40 (commenting on benefits of a
multinational committee created to supervise international securities transactions). The
commission would also reduce the repetitiveness of regulations on international issuers
while protecting all who are involved. Id.
262. See supra notes 132-154 and accompanying text (comparing the Memoran-
dum in Canada-United States links in order to come to an agreement over surveillance
techniques and other disparities).
263. Release No. 23075, supra note 16, at 11,856.
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must establish qualifying criteria to be met prior to participation in
transactions within the market links. Those involved in the internation-
alization of the securities markets should include current participants
as well as establish an opportunity for other countries to join those al-
ready linked. For example, the international securities linkage propos-
als should include Japan.2 4 The Securities Bureau of Japan wishes to
become linked with the United States markets, as its agreement on co-
operation with the SEC shows. 68 Initially, market linkage proposals
may be based upon geographic proximity,266 but Japanese markets are
appealing to American investors. "7
Among those nations, only qualified issuers should be allowed to
trade. Participation in market links should only be available to those
who are qualified to be listed. Qualified issuers must be of sufficient
financial size and must have a sound business record." 8 The issuers
may also become qualified by agreeing to follow international disclo-
sure standards. 9 The International Federation established extremely
low standards, increasing the likelihood that foreign issuers would ade-
quately meet the requirements of many world exchanges.27 0 While
264. NYSE Letter, supra note 41. Japan is becoming a major market of the world
and a major source for foreign investments. Id.
265. Shad's Speech, supra note 2.
266. But see Tokyo Letter, supra note 13 (commenting on the disadvantages of
Japan becoming linked to the United States, United Kingdom and Canada). Tokyo's
mWin justification for this viewpoint is their geographical distance from other major
stock exchanges and their position in the time zones. Therefore, the Exchange envisions
numerous problems arising if it participates in simultaneous trading at this time. Id.
267. Thomas, supra note 231, at 160. Canada is the most popular foreign market
for United States investors with Japan and the United Kingdom in second place. Id.
268. Whitman & Ransom Letter, supra note 40. A determination of a good
"track record" would include an examination of such factors as dividends, share prices
and experience on the markets. Id.
269. Pozen (Disclosure), supra note 1, at 87 (1981). A prerequisite for foreign
issuers to be listed upon an international exchange is their conformity with the interna-
tional disclosure standards. This requirement may be a greater incentive for foreign
issuers to be listed. Id. at 89. This criterion would be in addition to the other qualifica-
tions that are necessary. If these requirements were associated with the ability to be
listed upon foreign exchanges, then this would be a control that could be used by that
nation's markets and regulatory agencies. Id. The markets in each country, however,
should have the ability to distinguish their disclosure laws that are applied to domestic
issuers versus foreign issuers. Id. at 90.
270. Id. at 89. Yet higher minimum standards have been rejected because these
standards would discourage many issuers from investing in the markets. Higher stan-
dards may make trading extremely difficult for small investors. Id. Thus many com-
mentators support higher standards that would enable those issuers to have the ability
to trade on major markets in order to qualify for all the standards in the major ex-
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higher qualifications may exclude many small issuers, their exclusion
will not greatly affect the international market because their size is not
substantial."7 '
World class issuers would automatically qualify to be listed upon
any international exchange 272 These qualified issuers would have to
follow established international standards in order to permit their par-
ticipation in any world-wide market.2 7 3 A foreign country's refusal to
accept the United States' definition of a "world class ' ' 27 issuer, how-
ever, may hamper the progress of internationalizing the securities
markets.
In addition to the issuers, clearing houses should meet the estab-
lished requirements before qualifying to participate in securities trans-
actions. The SEC evaluates the eligibility of foreign clearing houses
involved in international linkages through its no-action letters.2 17 For-
eign clearing houses need to become members of United States clearing
agencies to ensure uniform membership among the countries' clearing
houses.2 76 This requirement, however, may eliminate some potential is-
suers not desiring to have numerous clearing house affiliations2 77 al-
though these clearing houses, cooperating with the established require-
ments, could be allowed to participate in the linkage between markets
through no-action letters. 8
VI. CONCLUSION
The internationalization of the securities markets is well under-
way. The survival of the exchange linkage concept indicates that nmir-
ket links will be the foundation from which securities transactions will
extend beyond domestic borders. The success of the linkage proposals
will eventually lead to 24-hour around-the-world markets and an in-
changes. Id.
271. Pozen, International Securities Markets: Comparative Disclosure Require-
ments, 3 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 194, 197 (1981) [hereinafter Pozen
(International)].
272. Id.
273. Id. at 195.
274. Exchange Release No. 6360, 46 Fed. Reg. 58,511, 58,512 (1981) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 229, 230, 239, 240, 249, 260) (proposed Nov. 20, 1981). A
world class issuer is defined as a foreign private issuer that has equity of no less than
$500 million, at least $150 million of which is beneficially held by United States resi-
dents, or an issuer that is registering "investment grade debt securities." Id.
275. See Release No. 21958, supra note 2.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. (mentioning the application of no-action letters).
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crease in international exchange links. Secrecy and blocking laws, how-
ever, threaten the future of this new internationalized securities mar-
kets system.
The regulatory agencies of. participating nations must coordinate
their efforts in order for an international system to be fair and to
thrive. With the establishment of multinational treaties and a formal
international securities organization of judicial stature, any enforce-
ment problems that arise could be solved in a uniform fashion. The
internationalization of the securities markets is inevitable. The future
success of the international market linkage structure depends upon the
cooperative efforts of the participants and their willingness to construct
a viable international securities framework.
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